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Abstract
Rule 11 bis forms a cornerstone of the ICTY’s completion strategy. Part I of this Article
provides an analysis of the elements of the rule. This Part will highlight the purpose of Rule 11
bis, offer an overview of the legal basis through which the transfer of jurisdiction has taken place
in the ICTY, discuss the referral process and the elements necessary for a successful referral, and,
finally, round out the discussion with an overview of the decision making process of the referral
bench in identifying which state is suitable to proceed with a trial once it is determined that the
indictment is compatible with the referral. Part II discusses the relevance of applicable substantive
law and its importance to the decisions of the referral bench, particularly in the determination
of a state’s ability to meet fair trial standards and to provide appropriate punishments. This Part
also points out the potential problems that national courts will face when examining applicable
substantive law. Part III highlights the tensions that could arise between Rule 11 bis and the
right to a fair trial, quality of prisons, and other issues that surround sentencing. Finally, Part IV
draws attention to the discretionary powers of the prosecutor to monitor the proceedings before
the national courts.
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RULE 11 BIS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
PROCESS OF REFERRALS TO NATIONAL 
COURTS IN ICTY JURISPRUDENCE 
Olympia Bekou* 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 25, 2007, Radovan Stanković escaped from the state 
police van transferring him to Sarajevo for dental treatment at a 
local hospital.1 He was the first indictee to have been transferred 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY” or “Tribunal”) to Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial by a 
national court.2 This transfer was made possible by virtue of Rule 
11 bis of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(“RPE”) (“Rule 11 bis”), which allows for the transfers of 
indictments to the national level.3 As the end of the Tribunal’s 
life looms in the distance, the use of Rule 11 bis forms an 
important part of its “completion strategy.”4 A number of 
 
*  School of Law, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom; Head, International 
Criminal Justice Unit, Human Rights Law Centre. I would like to thank David Krivanek, 
Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, and David Hayes for their research assistance. All errors and 
omissions are attributed to the Author alone. 
1. See Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Org. for Sec. and Co-operation in Eur. 
[OSCE], Sixth Report in the Case of Convicted Person Radovan Stankovic Transferred to the 
State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis at 2 (2007), available at http://www.oscebih.org/
documents/14067-eng.pdf. 
2. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo. [ICTY], Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Renders First Judgment in a Case Transferred by the Tribunal, 
No. JP/MOW/1126e (Nov. 14, 2006). 
3. See ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 11 bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.44 (Dec. 
10, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Rules] (providing guidelines for the transfer of cases from 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY” or “Tribunal”) 
to domestic courts). Rule 11 bis, which was adopted in 1997 and amended several times 
thereafter, is found in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”) for both the ICTY 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (“ICTR”). The language of 11 bis 
in the RPE of the ICTR, however, is different from that of the ICTY. Compare id., with 
Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 11 bis 
(Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/080314/080314.pdf 
[hereinafter ICTR Rules]. 
4. E.g., S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (setting 
deadlines for the ICTY to conclude investigations, trial, and work, respectively); see also 
S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004) (requiring periodic updates 
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referrals to courts in the former Yugoslavia have already taken 
place.5 Referrals from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) are also underway.6 
While Stanković’s escape is by no means unique, it has 
sparked debate as to the suitability of national courts to deal with 
cases originating at the ICTY.7 Stanković’s escape, the acquittal of 
 
from the ICTR and ICTY on the implementation of the completion strategy). For an 
analysis of the completion strategy, see Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the 
“Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
142, 158 (2005) (concluding that the tribunal needs the full support of the international 
community before the completion strategy can be fully implemented). See also Larry D. 
Johnson, Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining International Human 
Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 158, 158–59 (2005) (arguing 
that concerns over inadequate due process and prosecutorial independence resulting 
from the completion strategy are unfounded); Daryl A. Mundis, Completing the Mandates 
of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Lessons from the Nuremberg Process?, 28 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 591, 591–92 (2005) (suggesting that the closing of the Nuremberg 
trials may offer useful guidance for executing the completion strategy); Dominic Raab, 
Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy - Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War 
Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 82 (2005) (concluding that the 
completion strategy of the ICTY “may not be perfect from any single perspective, but it 
represents a reasonable compromise between the competing interests and values at 
stake”). For a brief overview of the implementation of the completion strategy, see ICTY: 
Completion Strategy, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
5. See Key Figures of ICTY Cases (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.icty.org/sid/24. The 
indictments of the following individuals have been referred: Rahim Ademi, Gojko 
Janković, Dušan Fuštar, Momćilo Gruban, Duško Knežević, Vladimir Kovačevič (Serbia), 
Paško Ljubičić, Željko Mejakić, Mirko Norac (Croatia), Mitar Rašević, Radovan 
Stanković, Savo Todović (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Milorad Trbić. Id. 
6. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, Decision on 
Rule 11 bis, Appeal, ¶ 1 (Aug. 30, 2006) (denying the prosecutor’s request for the 
transfer of Michel Bagaragaza to Norway for trial); see also Alhagi Marong, The ICTR 
Appeals Chamber Dismisses the Prosecutor’s Appeal to Transfer Michel Bagaragaza for Trial to 
Norway, ASIL INSIGHTS, Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights061003.cfm. An 
amended indictment and a different chamber composition have since ordered transfer 
of Bagaragaza to the Netherlands for trial. See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-
2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Indictment to the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (Apr. 13, 2007); see also Alhagi Marong, The ICTR Transfers 
Michel Bagaragaza to the Netherlands for Trial, ASIL INSIGHTS, June 18, 2007, 
http://www.asil.org/insights070618.cfm. On June 11, 2007, the ICTR Prosecutor 
requested the transfer of Flugence Kayishema for trial in Rwanda. See Press Release, 
ICTR, ICTR Prosecutor Requests Transfer of First Case to Rwanda, No. ICTR/INFO-9-2-
525.EN (June 12, 2007). 
7. See, e.g., Press Briefing, ICTY, ICTY Weekly Press Briefing – 31st May 2007, 
available at http://www.icty.org/sid/9772 (noting that the escape of Radovan Stankovic 
would be a factor for the judges making decisions on future cases involving transfers 
pursuant to Rule 11 bis). Subsequent requests by the ICTR prosecutor for referral in the 
cases of Hategekimana, Kanyarukiga, and Munyakazi were also denied. See Prosecutor v. 
Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for 
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Ademi,8 the lenient sentencing of Norac,9 and the indictment of 
Vladimir Kovačević,10 a defendant with clear mental health 
problems,11 all at the domestic level are just some of the matters 
deserving of critical attention. 
Neither the legal construction of Rule 11 bis nor its practical 
application is without problems. The emerging case law 
constitutes a good source for understanding the rule’s function 
and utility. This Article analyzes the constituting elements of Rule 
11 bis and aims to highlight its merits and expose its limitations. 
While recognizing that Rule 11 bis constitutes a necessary 
process, it is argued that the ICTY has been constrained in its 
determinations by the very nature of referrals and the specific 
application of the rule. 
Rule 11 bis forms a cornerstone of the ICTY’s completion 
strategy. Part I of this Article provides an analysis of the elements 
of the rule. This Part will highlight the purpose of Rule 11 bis, 
offer an overview of the legal basis through which the transfer of 
jurisdiction has taken place in the ICTY, discuss the referral 
 
the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, ¶ 78 (June 19, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 78 (June 6, 2008); Prosecutor v. 
Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 67 (May 28, 2008). 
8. See ICTY, Case Information Sheet: “Medak Pocket” (IT-04-78) Ademi & Norac, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/norac/cis/en/cis-ademinorac.pdf [hereinafter Ademi & 
Norac Case Information Sheet] (noting that Rahim Ademi was acquitted after trial in the 
Zagreb District Court in Croatia); see also Presuda Županijski sud Zarebu [Zagreb District 
Court], br. II K-rz-1/06, May 30, 2008 (Republike Hrvatske v. Ademi & Norac) (Croat.), 
available at http://www.centar-za-mir.hr/uploads/PRESUDA_Ademi_i_Norac.pdf. 
9. See Ademi & Norac Case Information Sheet, supra note 8 (noting that Mirko Norac 
was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment after trial in the Zagreb District Court in 
Croatia); see also Presuda Županijski sud Zarebu [Zagreb District Court], br. II K-rz-1/06 
(Croat.). For more information on the trial of Ademi and Norac in the Croatian court 
system, see Office in Zagreb, OSCE, Ademi-Norac Trial Concluded, Appeal Process Underway, 
COURIER, May–Sept. 2008, at 4, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/mc/
2008/10/33920_1197_en.pdf. 
10. See Okruzni sud Beogard [Belgrade District Court], Indictment Against 
Vladimir Kovačević, No. KTZR 5/07 (July 26, 2007) (Serb.), available at 
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/optuznice/o_2007_07_26_eng.pdf. Kovačević’s 
case was subsequently adjourned due to his mental state. See Okruzni sud Beogard, 
Resenje o odbecivanju optuznice [Resolution of the Indictment Decision], No. KTZR 
5/07, Dec. 5, 2007 (Serb.), available at http://okruznisudbg.rs/content/2007godina/
kovacevicvladimir/indictment3/at_downoad. 
11. See Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Public Version of the 
Decision on Accused’s Fitness to Enter a Plea and Stand Trial, ¶ 50 (Apr. 12, 2006) 
(concluding that Kovačević lacks capacity to stand trial before the ICTY). 
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process and the elements necessary for a successful referral, and, 
finally, round out the discussion with an overview of the decision 
making process of the referral bench in identifying which state is 
suitable to proceed with a trial once it is determined that the 
indictment is compatible with the referral. Part II discusses the 
relevance of applicable substantive law and its importance to the 
decisions of the referral bench, particularly in the determination 
of a state’s ability to meet fair trial standards and to provide 
appropriate punishments. This Part also points out the potential 
problems that national courts will face when examining 
applicable substantive law. Part III highlights the tensions that 
could arise between Rule 11 bis and the right to a fair trial, 
quality of prisons, and other issues that surround sentencing. 
Finally, Part IV draws attention to the discretionary powers of the 
prosecutor to monitor the proceedings before the national 
courts. 
I. STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF RULE 11 BIS 
A. Purpose of Rule 11 bis 
The rationale behind the adoption of Rule 11 bis can be 
seen primarily in the Tribunal’s limited life-span. Although its 
subsidiary role and practical consequence is involvement of the 
national courts in prosecuting and trying persons responsible for 
blatant violations of humanitarian and human rights law, its 
primary function is freeing up precious Tribunal time.12 With the 
ICTY firmly in the final stages of its operation, there is a pressing 
need to complete more cases.13 Several other steps have been 
taken to enhance the Tribunal’s efficiency, including the 
appointment of ad litem judges14 and other internal and external 
reforms,15 that aim to meet the 2008–2010 completion 
 
12. See Daryl A. Mundis & Fergal Gaynor, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1134, 1155–57 (2005). 
13. Id. 
14. See S.C. Res. 1329, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1329 (Nov. 30, 2000). 
15. See President of the ICTY, Twelfth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶¶ 7–10, delivered to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2005/532, A/60/267 (Aug. 17, 
2005) (citing to the amendment of rules 98 bis and 73(D), the introduction of the 
eCourt system, the increased communication between the Association of Defence 
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deadlines,16 although reports from the Tribunal’s president and 
prosecutor suggest that the ICTY is three to six years behind 
 
Counsel and the Tribunal as well as the Special War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the training of local judges as reforms designed to meet the 
completion goals of the ICTY). 
16. For the most recent assessment of the status of the completion strategy, see 
President, ICTY, Assessment and Report of Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Council resolution 1534 (2004), covering the period from 15 May to 
15 November 2009, Letter dated 12 November 2009 from the President of the Int’l 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council [hereinafter Letter dated 12 
November 2009], Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/2009/589 (Nov. 13, 2009). The letter is part of a 
semiannual series required under Security Council Resolution 1534 that contains 
reports from both the president and the prosecutor of the Tribunal. See S.C. Res. 1534, 
supra note 4, ¶ 6. A number of past reports were issued pursuant to this authority as well. 
See Letter dated 14 May 2009 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2009/252 (May 18, 2009); Letter 
dated 21 November 2008 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2008/729 (Nov. 24, 2008); Letter dated 13 May 2008 
from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for 
Serious Violations of Inte’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes 
I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2008/326 (May 14, 2008); Letter dated 12 November 2007 from the 
President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious 
Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. 
Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. 
S/2007/663 (Nov. 12, 2007); Letter Dated 15 May 2007 from the President of the Int’l 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2007/283 
(May 16, 2007); Letter dated 15 November 2006 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2006/898 (Nov. 16, 2006); 
Letter dated 29 May 2006 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2006/353 (May 31, 2006); Letter dated 30 November 
2005 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible 
for Serious Violations of Int’al Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes 
I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2005/781 (Dec. 14, 2005); Letter dated 25 May 2009 from the 
President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious 
Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. 
Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. 
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schedule.17 Nevertheless, the impending termination of the 
Tribunal’s operation, combined with a presumed “donor 
fatigue,”18 have fostered a shift towards national adjudication of 
cases originally intended to be tried internationally. 
Lifting some of the burden of the Tribunal’s workload is not 
the only function of Rule 11 bis. While the possibility of referrals 
is a consequence of the evolving capacity of national courts 
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia to deal with complex 
cases involving international crimes, referrals are also aimed at 
enhancing the national capacity to prosecute the most serious 
international crimes. Indeed article 9 of the ICTY Statute 
indicates that the Tribunal was not intended to replace or 
displace national courts; rather, the Tribunal coexists with 
national courts under a system of concurrent jurisdiction.19 
 
S/2005/343 (May 25, 2005); Letter dated 23 November 2004 from the President of the 
Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2004/897 
(Nov. 23, 2004); Letter dated 21 May 2004 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2004/420 (May 24, 2004). These 
reports are collected at ICTY, Reports and Publications: Completion Strategy, 
http://www.icty.org/tabs/14/2 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
17. See Raab, supra note 4, at 86 (reaching conclusion on the basis of October 2003 
reports). This prediction continues to be borne out by the latest assessments of the 
president and prosecutor. See Report of Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugosolavia, provided to the Security Council Under Paragraph 6 of 
Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), ¶ 7, Letter Dated 12 November 2009, supra note 
16, Annex II (predicting that appeals would continue to be processed through 2013). 
18. STEVEN D. ROPER & LILIAN A. BARRIA, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
71–72 (2006). 
19. Statute of the International Tribunal art. 9, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 
(qualifying the concept of concurrent jurisdiction with the Tribunal’s primacy); see also 
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808, ¶ 64, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (“[N]ational courts should be encouraged to exercise their 
jurisdiction in accordance with their relevant national laws and procedures . . . .”); 
Letter dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the 
United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 134–36, U.N. Doc. S/25266 
(Feb. 10, 1993) (report of the Commission of the French Jurists entrusted to study the 
creation of a criminal Tribunal for the adjudication of the crimes committed in the 
territory of the Former Yugoslavia and reproduced as a document of the Security 
Council). For an updated copy of the statute that consolidates all subsequent 
amendments, none of which affect article 9, see ICTY, Updated Statute of the International 
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Strengthening national legal orders should have been key to the 
operation of the ICTY from the beginning.20 
Rule 11 bis proceedings are the latest in a range of actions 
aiming to bolster national fora. Previous attempts included the 
“Outreach Programme” established by Judge McDonald in 
199921 and the “Rules of the Road” initiative.22 These initiatives, 
although not hugely successful,23 paved the way for the adoption 
of Rule 11 bis. Rule 11 bis was formally adopted by the Tribunal 
on November 12, 1997.24 
 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.icty.org/
x/file/legal%20library/statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
20. Rule 11 bis has been particularly helpful not only in rehabilitating and 
improving national judicial systems in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but also by encouraging the flow of evidence and other materials from an 
international to a national level, which has in turn stimulated the development of these 
legal systems to a point where the Tribunal is no longer necessary. See David Tolbert & 
Aleksander Kontic, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: 
Transitional Justice, the Transfer of Cases to National Courts, and Lessons for the ICC, in THE 
EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 135, 136–37 (Carsten 
Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2009). 
21. See Lal C. Vohrah & Jon Cina, The Outreach Programme, in ESSAYS ON ICTY 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 547 (Richard 
May et al., eds, 2001) (analyzing the Outreach Programme). 
22. The parties to the Dayton Agreement resolved in Rome on February 18, 1996 
that “persons other than those already indicted by the Tribunal may be arrested and 
detained for serious violations of international humanitarian law only pursuant to a 
previously issued order, warrant of indictment that had been reviewed and deemed 
consistent with international legal standards by the Tribunal.” President of the ICTY, 
Sixth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 135, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. S/1999/846, A/54/187 (Aug. 2, 1999); see also Graham T. Blewitt, The International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY 145, 150–51 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003). 
23. See David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: 
Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 14–15 
(2002). 
24. See Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 2 (May 17, 2005); see also President of the ICTY, Fifth Annual 
Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 105, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. S/1998/737, A/53/219 (Aug. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Fifth Annual Report of the 
ICTY] (noting the adoption of Rule 11 bis on November 12, 1997, at the conclusion of 
the fourteenth plenary session of the Tribunal). 
BEKOU_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  2:51 PM 
730 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723 
B. Introduction to Rule 11 bis 
“Referral” and “deferral” are terms used extensively in 
international criminal law. They both denote the transfer of 
jurisdiction from one level to another.25 More specifically, 
deferrals refer to the transfer of a case from national courts for 
the purposes of trial at the international level, whereas referrals 
describe the reverse.26 Deferrals are explicitly mentioned in the 
ICTY Statute and the RPE,27 but the term referral is only found in 
Rule 11 bis of the RPE.28 Another type of referral constitutes a 
trigger mechanism for the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) under the ICC’s Rome Statute.29 Despite 
the common spelling, ICC referrals draw a sharp contrast to 
ICTY referrals in that they do not bestow competence on the 
Tribunal and more broadly cover a “situation,” rather than a 
specific indictee.30 
The body entrusted with ICTY referrals is the referral bench. 
This quasi chamber within the tribunal is responsible for 
 
25. Referral is defined as the act of sending to another for consideration or 
decision. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1394 (9th ed. 2009); see also OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1213 (Joyce M. Hawkins & Robert Allen eds., 1991) (defining 
“refer” as to send or direct a person or question for decision). Defer, on the other hand, 
is defined as the act of yielding to another authority. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 
486; see also OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, at 378 (defining 
“defer” as to yield or make concessions in opinion or action). 
26. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 9; ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis; see also 
Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis: Partly Confidential (Attached Schedules to 
Annex I Filed Confidential), ¶ 7, Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-04-78-PT (Sept. 2, 
2004) (discussing the purpose of a referral). 
27. E.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 9(2); ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 9–11. 
28. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis. 
29. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13(b), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Security Council, for instance, referred 
the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the International Criminal Court following this trigger 
mechanism. See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). Other 
trigger mechanisms include the proprio motu initiation of investigations by the prosecutor 
or state parties referrals, such as the situation in the Central African Republic, Press 
Release, Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central 
African Republic, No. ICC-OTP 20050107-86 (Jan. 7, 2005), the situation Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, No. ICC-OTP-20040419-50 (Apr. 19, 2004), and the 
situation in the Republic of Uganda, Press Release, ICC, President of Uganda Refers 
Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, No. ICC-20040129-
44 (Jan. 29, 2004), the three other situations currently under investigation. See Rome 
Statute, supra, arts. 13, 15. 
30. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 13(b). 
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determining the suitability of an indictment for referral.31 It 
consists of three judges specially appointed by the Tribunal’s 
president and has the power to order referrals either on its own 
accord or on the basis of a request by the prosecutor.32 
The referral bench shares many of the characteristics of a 
chamber. It too consists of three judges that have, to date, always 
been the same33 and operates with reference to the ICTY Statute 
and the RPE.34 Unlike a chamber, the three judges are not 
assigned to the bench at all times; instead, membership is 
determined by the Tribunal’s president on the basis of the cases 
to be heard.35 Importantly, the bench also differs from a chamber 
in that it does not decide cases in their substance.36 The bench is 
limited to deciding whether certain indictments will be 
transferred to national courts for trial without instructing the 
latter on how to proceed with the case.37 
Despite the fact that the bench may only review certain 
aspects of the indictment in its referral decision, such decisions 
are not administrative in nature. Finding a suitable forum for 
trial is an important judicial function. Its equivalent in the ICC 
would be the determination on complementarity, and the 
pretrial chamber’s decision on whether the case will remain with 
a national court or whether it will be tried in The Hague.38 In 
Rule 11 bis, the Tribunal seeks to establish whether to send an 
indictment back to national courts rather than continue with the 
trial internationally, rendering Rule 11 bis the reverse process of 
ICC complementarity. 
 
31. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A). 
32. See id. R. 11 bis(B). 
33. See William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal 
Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of 
the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 326–27 (2008) 
(identifying the three judges as Alphons Orie, O-Gon Kwon, and Kevin Parker). 
34. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(H) (equating the bench with a chamber 
in terms of its powers and obligation to follow procedures under the RPE, “insofar as 
applicable”). 
35. See id. R. 11 bis(A). 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 18; see also Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, 
Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the International Criminal Court, in 
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN 
BOS 57, 70–71 (Herman von Hebel et al. eds., 1999). 
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The ICTY Statute39 makes no reference to a referral bench. 
As the bench is only envisaged in Rule 11 bis of the RPE40 its 
legality has been challenged.41 In the Stanković appeals decision, 
the defense, on its first ground of appeal, questioned the power 
of the bench to refer a case on the basis that “Rule 11bis lacks a 
legal basis in the statute and in any implied or inherent powers 
that the Tribunal may have.”42 The defense argued further that 
“[t]he [United Nations (“U.N.”)] Security Council’s stated 
support for the completion strategy is not enough . . . to create a 
legal basis for transferring cases out of the Tribunal’s’ 
jurisdiction,”43 nor does any provision of the statute provide a 
legal basis for the adoption of Rule 11 bis.44 The establishment of 
the ICTY by Security Council resolutions means that certain 
aspects of its existence depend on the political will of its parent 
body. The Tribunal enjoys significant autonomy in its everyday 
operation.45 Security Council resolutions, nevertheless, 
 
39. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19. The statute may only be amended by Security 
Council resolution. Since its adoption in 1993, the Statute for the International Tribunal 
(“ICTY Statute”) has been amended ten times, most recently on the July 7, 2009. See S.C. 
Res. 1877, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009). Amendments included, among others, 
the creation of an additional trial chamber and the appointment of ad litem judges. See 
S.C. Res. 1660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1660 (Feb. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1329 (Dec. 5, 2000). 
40. The text of the original ICTY Statute empowered the judges of the Tribunal to 
adopt a set of rules of procedure and evidence. Statute of the International Tribunal, 
supra note 19, art. 15. Implicit in the power to create these rules is the power to amend 
them. See Gideon Boas, A Code of Evidence and Procedure for International Criminal Law? 
The Rules of the ICTY, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW 
OF THE ICTY 1, 4 (Gideon Boas & William Schabas eds., 2003). When the rules were first 
adopted they contained a provision that governed their subsequent amendment. See 
ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 6. Thus, the RPE are judge-made and subject to frequent 
amendments to meet the Tribunal’s changing needs. The RPE have been revised forty-
four times since they were first adopted. See ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
http://www.icty.org/sid/136 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
41. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, Decision on 
Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶¶ 10–17 (Sept. 1, 2005) (denying a Rule 11 bis appeal and 
allowing, in part, the prosecutor’s appeal). 
42. Id. ¶ 10. 
43. Id. ¶ 11. 
44. Id. 
45. Perhaps the most disputable incident, which is viewed by some as the product 
of Security Council intervention, is the decision to refrain from prosecution in the case 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing. For an analysis of the decision, see 
generally Michael Cottier, What Relationship Between the Exercise of Universal and Territorial 
Jurisdiction? The Decision of 13 December 2000 of the Spanish National Court Shelving the 
Proceedings Against Guatemalan Nationals Accused of Genocide, in INTERNATIONAL AND 
BEKOU_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  2:51 PM 
2010] AN EXAMINATION OF RULE 11 BIS OF THE ICTY 733 
determine the Tribunal’s life span, as well as the strategy leading 
to the termination of its function.46 The ICTY has therefore 
enjoyed the freedom of undertaking those actions necessary for 
its effective functioning.47 Whether the establishment and 
operation of a referral bench falls within these so called inherent 
powers of the Tribunal is debatable. 
The referral bench rejected the appellant’s arguments in 
Stankovic and based its analysis on the Tribunal’s concurrent 
jurisdiction, thereby opting not to elaborate on the inherent 
powers doctrine.48 The concurrent, as opposed to exclusive, 
jurisdiction is good enough indication for the bench that a 
certain role is envisaged for alternative national jurisdictions.49 
Notwithstanding the concurrent nature of the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, the preceding argument is not entirely convincing. 
Although the role reserved for national courts should not be 
disregarded, concurrent jurisdiction, as found in article 9(1) of 
the ICTY Statute, does not provide the requisite authority for 
setting up a system to transfer cases to domestic courts. Rather, 
concurrent jurisdiction was chosen to highlight that the Tribunal 
is not intended to replace or displace national courts50 and, 
through deferral, enable trial of the most important cases at the 
international level. Rule 11 bis does not facially negate the 
Tribunal’s concurrent jurisdiction because it does not remove 
each and every case from the Tribunal for trial by a national 
court. Together with deferrals, Rule 11 bis constitutes a further 
mechanism for allocating cases between the national and the 
 
NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 843 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001). 
46. See JEAN-PIERRE COT & ALAIN PELLET, LA CHARTRE DES NATIONS UNIES 216 (2d 
ed. 1991) (Fr.) (“Les conditions de suppression d’un organe subsidiaire sont symétriques des 
conditions de création: la suppression résulte d’une manifestation de volonté de l’organe principal 
créateur.”). 
47. See generally Paola Gaeta, Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, in 
MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO 
CASSESE 353 (Lal C. Vohrah et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the Tribunal’s inherent 
powers). 
48. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 14; cf. Rocío Digón, Recent 
Developments, The Stankovic Decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 283–84 (2006) (noting the impact of the Tadić 
decision on the Stanković appeal). 
49. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 14 (“[I]t is clear that alternative 
national jurisdictions have consistently been contemplated for ‘transfer’ of accused.”). 
50. See supra note 19. 
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international spheres. Be that as it may, reference to the latter as 
the sole legal basis for referrals is misconstrued, given that they 
are not explicitly mentioned in article 9 of the ICTY Statute, 
which revolves solely around deferrals.51 
Additional legal basis for referrals may be found in Security 
Council Resolution 1503, which explicitly endorses the 
completion strategy adopted by the Tribunal, an integral part of 
which is the transfer of indictments to national courts.52 This 
resolution, though not explicitly referring to Rule 11 bis, 
indirectly approves of the chosen method. Nevertheless, it fails to 
explain why the Security Council declined a statute amendment 
to explicitly provide for referrals.53 Given that the Tribunal had 
to find a way to lighten its workload and that no amendment of 
the statute was forthcoming, the only other available method to 
achieve this was by amending the RPE, which can be 
accomplished by the judges alone.54 This approach is partially 
successful. Although no other option was practical, an RPE 
amendment of this kind stumbles upon the statute itself.55 Article 
15 of the ICTY Statute lists the specific reasons for which rules 
may only be adopted.56 To benefit from this provision, referrals 
would have to be construed as “conduct of the pre-trial phase of 
the proceedings.”57 The decision as to the appropriate forum for 
subsequent trial may technically belong to a phase prior to trial, 
but it does not cover the pretrial phase stricto sensu, which in the 
ICTY is concluded with the review of the indictment58 and which, 
has yet to take place before national courts. Given that article 15 
does not contain a definition of what acts would fall within the 
pretrial phase, a literal interpretation of this provision may be 
 
51. See Susan Somers, Rule 11bis of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: Referral of Indictments to National Courts, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 175, 
176 (2007) (arguing that referrals are a “[r]etreat from [p]rimacy”). 
52. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1, 7. 
53. See Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 11. 
54. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
55. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 11 (referring to article 9 and 29 in 
the context of Tribunal jurisdiction). 
56. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 15 (“The judges of the International 
Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial 
phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection 
of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters.”). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. art. 19. 
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accepted. In practice, had the Security Council’s objected to the 
inclusion of Rule 11 bis in the RPE, it could have intervened by 
specifically adopting a resolution amending the statute to the 
opposite effect or by prohibiting such transfers. Given the 
Security Council’s acquiescence, it is beyond doubt that the 
Security Council agrees with the path chosen by the Tribunal’s 
judges. Nevertheless, a statute amendment explicitly providing 
for referrals would have been preferable to the ad hoc solution 
reached and would have eliminated challenges to its legality by 
putative transferees. 
By referring to the resolution outlining the Tribunal’s 
completion strategy, ample authority may be discerned for the 
creation of the referral bench, justification of its operation, and 
subsequent analysis of its practice. 
C. The Referral Process 
The bench is not obliged to, but “may,” order a referral.59 
More specifically, the bench may refer cases only after being 
satisfied that “the accused with receive a fair trial and that the 
death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”60 Referral 
decisions are therefore evaluated on the basis of whether the 
bench exercised its discretion correctly based on the criteria set 
out in Rule 11 bis.61 
Of the possible cases that may be considered for referral, 
there are those that have been investigated to different degrees 
by the prosecutor but did not result in an indictment62 and those 
that, although they have been investigated and indictments 
against named suspects have been issued, may be subsequently 
referred to national courts for trial. It is the latter category that is 
the focus of this Article. 
 
59. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A); see also Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case 
No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 10 (Apr. 7, 2006) (discussing the discretion of the referral bench in 
issuing orders). 
60. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B). 
61. Mejakić, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 10. 
62. See id. art. 18 (governing indictments). In the context of referrals, see Press 
Release, ICTY, Radovan Stankovic Transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
CT/MO/1008e (Sept. 29, 2005). 
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Despite the reference to “authorities of a State,”63 national 
jurisdictions have generally played a limited role. In Rule 11 bis, 
state involvement in the decision to refer is limited to 
representations states are invited to make before the referral 
bench.64 These are mainly for the purpose of satisfying the bench 
that the accused will receive a fair trial before the national courts 
considered for referral and that the death penalty will not be 
imposed.65 However, once the referral is upheld, the trial itself 
will be conducted exclusively before national courts, which have 
sole responsibility for determining the innocence or guilt of the 
accused.66 
Rule 11 bis contains a series of hurdles that must be 
overcome in order for trial to take place at the national level. 
The most important of those is gravity: unless the crimes and the 
responsibility of the accused involve lower or intermediate 
indictees, the Tribunal cannot seek an appropriate state to 
receive the indictment. Subsequently, the referral bench 
examines the applicable substantive law likely to be used by a 
state upon referral, as well as issues relating to sentencing and 
fair trial.67 
1. Gravity 
A judicial examination into the gravity of a case has become 
increasingly important in international criminal law. The concept 
finds express use in the ICC Statute with regard to the 
admissibility of a case.68 In the ICTY, however, the emphasis on 
 
63. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A); see also Mejakić, Decision on Joint 
Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 10 (Apr. 7, 2006) 
(discussing the discretion of the referral bench in issuing orders). 
64. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B). 
65. See id. 
66. See id. R. 11 bis(D). 
67. See generally ICTY & the U.N. Interregional Crime & Justice Research Inst., 
ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, at 168–70 (May 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/about/reports%20and%20publications/
manual_developed_practices/icty_manual_on_developed_practices.pdf (discussing 
criteria for referral, monitoring, and other post-referral issues). 
68. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 17(1)(d) (providing that the case shall be 
determined inadmissible where “the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court”); see also Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01-04-01/06-8-Corr, 
Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber Is Decision of 10 February 2006 and the 
Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, ¶¶ 42–75 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
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gravity is rather recent.69 The focus of the Tribunal was not 
necessarily on more senior perpetrators from the outset. Even if a 
“pyramidal strategy”70 were followed, perpetrators like Duško 
Tadić, the Tribunal’s first accused,71 were tried in The Hague 
largely because the ICTY did not have many persons present for 
trial at the time.72 The Tribunal also dealt with accused who 
would now be classified as “small fr[ies]” later in its operation 
due to many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) 
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“SFOR”) 
arrests.73 
Gravity is an integral part of referral determinations under 
Rule 11 bis. As a result, it has been contested by both the defense 
and the prosecutorial sides trying to either prevent or acheive a 
referral.74 Unlike domestic criminal proceedings where the 
accused tend to downplay higher gravity, indictees facing a Rule 
 
69. Despite various references to gravity, the Tribunal established its criteria for its 
adjudication in Rule 11 bis case law. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General, Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶¶ 64–65, 
U.N. Doc. S/25704, ¶ 28 (May 3, 1993). Moreover, the President of the Security Council 
stated on July 23, 2002, that the Council “recognized” that the ICTY should be 
concentrating on those leaders most responsible in the war and “endorse[d] the . . . 
broad strategy for the transfer of cases involving intermediary and lower-level accused to 
competent national jurisdictions.” See Press Release, Security Council, Statement by the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/21 (July 23, 2002); see also 
Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court, 17 CRIM. L.F. 281, 296 
(2006); William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International 
Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CT. JUST. 731, 746 (2008).  
70. Antonio Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 585, 
586–88 (2004); see also Nicola Piacente, Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine 
for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 446, 447–48 (2004). 
71. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 6, 9 
(May 7, 1997) (noting that Tadić was arrested by the German police in Munich on 
February 13, 1994, and transferred to the ICTY on April 24, 1995). 
72. See José E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2031, 2093 (1998) (agreeing with the piecemeal approach on the basis that the 
prosecutor is able to “work out kinks while the stakes [were] not perceived to be as 
high,” and to “build a pyramid of factual evidence that ultimately leads upward to 
higher-level officials”). 
73. At one time, accused were arriving in the Hague at the rate of one per month. 
See Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of 
Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 87, 87 (2001). 
74. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 15–16 (July 25, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-
65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 
16–17 (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 15–16 (May 17, 2005). 
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11 bis referral have in practice mostly argued in favour of higher 
gravity so as to receive trial internationally.75 There are a number 
of potential explanations for this, ranging from trust in the 
international criminal Tribunal (or rather distrust in national 
courts by certain indictees),76 a sense of pride, but more likely, 
the possibility of receiving more lenient sentences, if tried in The 
Hague. 
Rule 11 bis(C), which covers gravity, expressly refers to 
Security Council Resolution 1534.77 The rule endorses the 
obligation found in operative paragraph five of the resolution to 
“concentrate on the most senior leaders suspected of being most 
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” 
and provides the mechanism for its implementation.78 The rule is 
not the only safeguard against trying lower level perpetrators in 
The Hague. A more potent provision is rule 28(A) of the RPE 
which subjects the prosecutorial efforts to a form of judicial 
trusteeship.79 
 
75. See Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 16; Mejakić, 
Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 17; 
Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 16. 
76. These objections were put forward mainly by Bosnian Serbs whose indictments 
were referred to the Bosnian State Court. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on Referral of Case 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 50, 52, 54, 56–57, 59; Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 23, 53, 79. It is doubtful whether they would have had the same 
reaction if they were referred to Serbian courts instead. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 23; Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under 
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 23, 53, 79. This may be seen from the written motions of Serbian nations 
before the Bosnian State Court. They all displayed varying degrees of disrespect to the 
court, ranging from references to “Jamahiriya Bosnia and Herzegovina” the “so called 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” to claiming no understanding of the language of the 
court, and refusing to be present during hearings. See, e.g., Fonz za humanitarno pravo 
[Humanitarian Law Center], Slučaj "Kravica" Mitrović i dr. [Case of “Kravitz” Mitrović et 
al.], http://www.hlc-rdc.org/PravdaIReforma/Sudjenje-za-ratne-zlocine/
SudjenjaZaRatne-Nacionalna-sudjenja-za-ratne-zlocine/Sudjenje-za-ratne-nacionalna-
BiH/149.sr.html (Serb.). It may not be that these indictees placed any trust in the ICTY, 
but they definitely objected to being tried by Bosnian authorities. Cf. Prosecutor v. 
Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the 
Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20, (Sept. 14, 2005) (recognizing that 
Norac and Ademi were perceived by a great number of Croats as national heroes and 
did not object to the referral). 
77. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(C). 
78. See S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 4, ¶ 5; see also S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 4, ¶ 8. 
79. See Raab, supra note 4, at 90; Johnson, supra note 4, at 164–66; Mundis, supra 
note 4, at 606, 612. A discussion of this provision is, however, beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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Pursuant to Rule 11 bis the bench seeks to refer indictments 
that are “not ipso facto incompatible with referral[s].”80 If the 
alleged crimes are not so grave as to demand international trial,81 
they would be equally suitable for trial by either the Tribunal or 
national courts.82 The threshold is consistent with the bench’s 
view on concurrent jurisdiction, where Rule 11 bis is seen as a 
mechanism for distinguishing amongst “alternative” 
jurisdictions.83 At no point is it indicated that the indictments 
selected for referral should not have been prepared at the 
international level in the first place. Cases examined for referral 
differ from those that would be tried ab initio before national 
courts, or those which, despite having been investigated 
internationally, did not result in indictments at the Tribunal. The 
seriousness of referral cases, although acknowledged, does not 
suffice to retain them for trial at the Tribunal. 
2. The Elements: Gravity of Crimes and Level of Responsibility 
Rule 11 bis(C) specifically directs a court to consider gravity 
in determining whether to refer an indictment to a national 
court.84 Provided that the gravity of the crimes is low and the 
accused holds limited responsibility, the indictment is suitable for 
referral.85 
The first element contained in Rule 11 bis(C) requires that 
the charged crimes be of sufficient gravity in order to warrant 
referral.86 However, the rule is silent on how gravity is 
 
80. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, Decision on 
Rule 11 bis Referral, at 7 n.14 (May 17, 2005); Janković, Decision on Referral of Case 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20. 
81. See Prosecution’s Further Submission Pursuant to Chamber’s Decision of 14 
April 2005, ¶ 2, Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT (Apr. 28, 
2005); see also Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 15. 
82. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 18 (July 8, 2005) (acknowledging that certain cases are 
better placed before an international forum whereas others “would also be suitable for 
prosecution before a competent national court”). The case is therefore suitable for trial 
either by the Tribunal or by national courts. Id. 
83. See id. 
84. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(C) (citing S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 4). 
85. Id. Interestingly, the prosecutor in the trial of Norac and Ademi requested 
referral on the basis of a single criterion. See Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 
bis, ¶ 9, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT (Sept. 2, 2004). 
86. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(C). 
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determined so the threshold applicable to this inquiry is left to 
the determination of the bench.87  
Despite lacking an established hierarchy of crimes in the 
statute or rules, the Tribunal’s case law has long accepted that 
certain crimes are graver than others.88 Each of the crimes falling 
within the jurisdiction of the ICTY has the potential to be grave, 
depending on the circumstances. Indeed, the sentencing scheme 
contained in the statute does not carry different sentences for 
different crimes.89 The specific crimes committed are of interest, 
not necessarily the type of crimes. Even though gravity is 
examined on an individualed basis, the submission of evidence is 
not contemplated in the course of the referral hearing.90 This 
may be explained by the nature of the process and the fact that 
the trial will follow. However, failing to examine evidence can be 
detrimental to the defense, which may be less able to rebut the 
prosecutorial assessment on gravity. A detailed examination into 
the commission of the alleged crimes would guarantee a better 
insight into their gravity and therefore facilitate the bench’s 
determination. While the current approach may be efficient, it is 
by no means thorough. On the other hand, entering deeper into 
the presentation of evidence that by no means enters into the 
merits of the case could infringe the accused’s presumption of 
innocence, because determinations of the international tribunal 
would presumably have significant weight during the trial before 
national courts. 
In setting the standards for gravity, other cases may be of 
assistance to ensure that the right indictments are referred to 
national courts. Previous judgments pronounced by the Tribunal 
 
87. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis. 
88. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment, ¶ 16 
(Sept. 4, 1998) (describing genocide as “the crime of crimes”); see also Ademi & Norac, 
Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 
bis, ¶ 21 (Sept. 14, 2005) (paraphrasing the government of Croatia as stating that crimes 
against humanity and war crimes “form the lower levels of the hierarchy of the crimes 
within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction”). 
89. See Ademi & Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of 
Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20 (referring to the argument advanced by defense 
counsel that there is no “differentiated span of sentences” in the Statute); see also 
Olaoluwa Olusanya, Do Crimes Against Humanity Deserve a Higher Sentence than War 
Crimes?, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004) (discussing the need to apply 
differentiated sentences for different crimes). 
90. See, e.g., Ademi & Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic 
of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20. 
BEKOU_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  2:51 PM 
2010] AN EXAMINATION OF RULE 11 BIS OF THE ICTY 741 
are not precedents as sources of law, but do serve as tools of 
interpretation.91 Even so, should the bench consider cases 
already tried by the Tribunal? Should the bench consider cases 
relating to indictments already referred or those which are being 
considered for referral? Or, should cases be selected using some 
temporal element? For instance, are 1997, when Rule 11 bis was 
inserted into the RPE,92 or even 2003–2004, when the completion 
strategy was adopted,93 critical dates? 
In the Norac case, the bench accepted that it is “impossible 
to measure the gravity of any crime in isolation” and, apart from 
the circumstances of a crime, gravity “must also be viewed in the 
context of other cases tried by [the] Tribunal.”94 The bench did 
not, however, specify which other cases it was prepared to 
consider. Several attempts have been lodged by defense counsel 
in order to compare their position with previous cases tried 
before the ICTY and, more specifically, other referral cases. In 
the Stanković referral, for instance, the defense argued that 
Vuković in the Kunarac case was tried by the ICTY despite being 
charged with crimes of “much lesser scope” than the case at 
hand.95 The defense for Todović argued that the crimes charged 
are ‘“quite serious” and “more grave” than the offenses charged 
in other trials that commenced after the relevant Security Council 
resolutions endorsing the Tribunal’s completion strategy.96 In the 
Janković appeal the appellant cited both cases tried by the ICTY 
and cases where referral was considered in an effort to convince 
the panel to retain the case.97 The appeals chamber correctly 
rejected the submission that it was obliged to consider other 
 
91. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11 
bis Referral, ¶ 26 (Nov. 15, 2005). 
92. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra note 4. 
94. Ademi & Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of 
Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 28. 
95. Transcript of Record at 212, Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT 
(Mar. 4, 2005). 
96. Savo Todovic’s Defence Response to the Prosecution’s 11 bis Motion and 
Defence’s Submission of Further Information in Accordance with the Referral Bench’s 
Decision of 14 April 2005 and in the Context of the Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11 
bis, ¶ 23, Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT (Apr. 28, 2005). 
97. Defence Appellant’s Brief, ¶¶ 33–35, Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-
23/2-AR11bis.2 (Aug. 23, 2005) (referring to the cases of Halilović, Knezevic, Kovačevič, 
Stakić, and Stanković). 
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cases as a matter of law.98 The possibility, however, that the bench 
should be “guided by a comparison with an indictment in 
another case” was not dismissed.99 Nevertheless, the bench did 
not clarify which other cases were eligible. 
The prosecution has also tried using other cases in support 
of their position. In the case of Dragomir Milošević the 
prosecutor conceded the gravity of the alleged crimes but 
unsuccessfully argued that the alleged crimes, albeit serious, were 
already tried before the ICTY in another case and the 
“contribution to the historical record of the events would be 
reduced in importance.”100 Even though Rule 11 bis did not 
include whether a conduct had been “sufficiently tried” in 
another case—or even whether the historical facts surrounding 
the conduct were well documented—among its criteria,101 
reliance on other cases in the future was left open. First, the 
bench mentioned that the Galić case, to which the prosecutor 
referred, was on appeal.102 The relevance of this fact was not 
discussed any further but it was indicative that the bench would 
probably have considered the outcome of the appeal if a decision 
were rendered. Second, the judges moved on to state that the 
conduct in Milošević, relative to Galić, covered two distinct periods 
 
98. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 26 (Nov. 15, 2005). 
99. Id. 
100. See Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I, II, and III, , ¶ 
22, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT (Jan. 31, 2005) (citing Prosecutor v. 
Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment (Dec. 5, 2003)). This argument might have some 
merit had the sole purpose of the ICTY were the establishment of an accurate historical 
record. As is, for instance, the general purpose of a truth and reconciliation 
commission. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Accomodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and 
National Reconciliation: The U.N. Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 952, 
954 (2001); G. G. J. Knoops, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Models and 
International Tribunals: a Comparison (Sept. 29–Oct. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.unpo.org/downloads/ProfKnoops.pdf. For a more elaborate description on 
the function served by a truth and reconciliation commission, see Jamie L. Wacks, A 
Proposal for Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the United States Through Personal 
Stories, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 195, 204–207 (2000). While international trial may 
contribute to that cause, their function extends beyond compiling a record of crimes, 
not least because they determine a person’s guilt or innocence. See José E. Alvarez, 
Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 375, 382 
(1999); Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned From ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427, 
428 (2004). 
101. See Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20 (July 8, 
2005). 
102. See id. 
BEKOU_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  2:51 PM 
2010] AN EXAMINATION OF RULE 11 BIS OF THE ICTY 743 
in time and were therefore not “fully addressed.”103 The decision 
stressed how the case at hand differed from Galić rather than 
emphasise that the latter would not have had an impact on the 
former’s outcome anyway.104 This is due to the higher gravity, 
which was also conceded by the prosecutor and not dependent 
upon whether the facts surrounding conduct were fully 
addressed in another case. The confusing approach adopted by 
the bench is unfortunate because it will not preclude similar 
arguments from being raised in other cases. 
There is yet another reason why the inclusion of the 
criterion whether a conduct was sufficiently tried is unacceptable. 
As noted above, once the indictment is referred to the national 
courts, they have sole responsibility and freedom to determine all 
the facts surrounding the case, thus establishing its own 
“historical record.”105 If the case would be referred on the 
grounds that these findings were already well established by the 
Tribunal in previous cases, national courts would be practically 
bound to implement those findings in their prospective 
judgments. Although national courts certainly can rely on these 
findings, their obligation to do so would seriously impact their 
independence. 
The discussion illustrates that the referral bench does not 
have a clear view on the input that other cases may have on 
referral decisions. Although each indictment is examined within 
the context of its own facts, the chamber should set the criteria 
that it is willing to apply more concretely. Parity among 
indictments selected for referral would help create a level playing 
field and assist the Tribunal in setting the threshold at the 
desired level so that indictments eligible for referral are 
identified and dealt with at the appropriate jurisdictional level. 
Previous cases tried by the Tribunal are useful to the extent that 
 
103. Id. 
104. See id. 
105. Besides the fact that any other solution would infringe the principle of 
independence of national judiciary this position can be inferred from the fact that the 
chamber did not want to discuss any issues that could irrevocably determine the conduct 
of the national courts. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, 
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 46 (May 17, 2005) (discussing the 
applicable law). However, it could be argued that the freedom and responsibility to 
determine facts are to some extent infringed by the provisions of the Rule 11 bis(D)(iii), 
(iv) and (F).  
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they highlight higher gravity in order to make the distinction 
with “lower” indictees clearer. Inserting a temporal element to 
distinguish amongst cases would not have assisted much, as 
neither the adoption of Rule 11 bis nor the completion strategy 
impact the jurisdictional question. What changes is the forum for 
trial for a certain number of cases, which is in line with the 
Tribunal’s view on concurrent jurisdiction. 
Besides considering other cases, the bench has employed 
two quantitative standards to determine gravity.106 If the alleged 
crimes do not cover a wide area and are limited in duration, then 
an indictment is likely to be suitable for referral.107 When 
contrasted with Galić, which the prosecution argued involved “a 
pervasive and continuous campaign of shelling and sniping 
conducted at a large scale on an almost daily basis over many 
months,”108 it becomes evident why the case against Dragomir 
Milošević was tried by the ICTY. The bench’s approach does not 
take account of the particular facts and participation of the 
alleged perpetrator in the commission of the crimes in 
question.109 Although this is in line with examining the conflict as 
a whole, it does not necessarily assist in defining the gravity of the 
specific crimes. Gravity of the crimes is examined almost 
mechanically, based on the factual situation on the ground. To 
add to this surgical approach, the number of victims is taken into 
account: the larger the number, the higher the gravity of the 
crime.110 Conversely, a small or limited number of victims is 
 
106. See Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral 
to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 22, (Sept. 14, 
2005); see also Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-
PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 21 
(July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes 1 and II, ¶ 23 (July 8, 
2005) (mentioning that the defendants were committed as part of a joint criminal 
enterprise but failing to elaborate); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, 
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (May 17, 2005). 
107. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19; Janković, 
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19. 
108. Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I, II, and III, ¶ 20, 
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT (Jan. 31, 2005) (citing Prosecutor v. 
Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 764 (Dec. 5, 2003)). 
109. To a certain extent, this aspect can be covered by examining the role of the 
accused. 
110. Compare Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis 
with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 23 (noting that the number of victims was large), 
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indicative of lower gravity.111 The bench has never proceeded 
with an evaluation of defense arguments when the numbers of 
victims was contested.112 Nor has it proactively determined these 
numbers though a fact-finding process;113 in effect, displaying 
“blind trust” towards the prosecutorial assessments. Similarly, 
attempts to consider some qualitative elements in the assessment 
of gravity, such as the civilian status of the victims or the close 
range of killing and destruction, have left the bench 
unperturbed.114 
The consideration of geographic, temporal, or numerical 
factors reveals an attempt to insert some objectivity in the 
decision-making process. This attempt is only partially successful. 
Undoubtedly, these factors assist in quantifying the gravity of the 
crimes. However, a strict application of the above elements is 
bereft of an evaluative approach. A case, despite its limited 
geographic scope, temporal duration, or low number of victims, 
may still fulfill the criteria for deferral under Rule 9(iii), if it 
serves the interests of justice.115 This, in turn, would render the 
case unsuitable for referral, and would call for trial at the 
Tribunal.116 However unlikely this may be at this late stage of the 
Tribunal’s operation, the ICTY should be open to consider such 
cases, in line with the statute and RPE. While the use of set 
 
with Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (characterizing 
offenses committed against sixteen victims as “limited in scope”). 
111. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19. This 
precise argument was advanced by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
Stanković referral. See Response by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to 
Questions Posed by the Specially Appointed Chamber in Its Decision for Further 
Information in the Context of the Proecutor’s Request Under Rule 11 bis of 9 February 
2005 at 1, Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT (Feb. 24, 2005). 
112. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on 
Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 17 (Nov. 15, 2005) (arguing on appeal that the Bench only 
considered the crimes alleged in the indictment to the exclusion of “thousands” of 
others). 
113. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 18 (considering only the 
facts alleged in the indictment); Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under 
Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 22 (same); Stanković, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 18 (May 17, 2005) (same). 
114. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for 
Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (Sept. 
14, 2005). 
115. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 9(iii) (allowing deferral if “what is in issue is 
closely related to, or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal questions which may 
have implications for investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal”). 
116. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 10(C). 
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criteria is welcome, a more inquisitive evaluation of the gravity of 
crimes should be encouraged. 
The second element in Rule 11 bis(C) covers the level of 
responsibility of the accused.117 This is determined by reference 
to the role of the defendant in the commission of the alleged 
offenses in tandem with their position in the civil or military 
hierarchy.118 In numerous court orders by the referral bench, the 
bench invited briefing on whether the role of the accused and his 
position and rank were to be taken conjunctively or whether they 
were alternatives.119 If taken together, the threshold would be 
higher than if the two factors were deemed to be alternatives. 
The bench in Norac determined that both elements should be 
examined together.120 Albeit stricter, this approach allows for a 
clearer determination of the role and position of the accused, 
providing a more accurate picture on gravity. 
Drawing the outer limits of senior responsibility is not an 
easy task. Nor is distinguishing between the “most senior leaders” 
and their “lower” counterparts. Although most would agree that 
persons beyond the architects of an “overall policy”121 would also 
be classed as leaders, it is difficult to decide where to precisely 
draw the circle of leadership. When determining whether their 
 
117. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(C) (requiring consideration of “the level 
of responsibility of the accused”). 
118. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19; Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case 
No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision for Further Information in the Context of the Prosecutor’s 
Motion Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (Sept. 5, 2005); Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral 
of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes 1 and II, ¶ 23; Stanković, Decision 
on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19. 
119. E.g., Ljubičić, Decision for Further Information in the Context of the 
Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11 bis, at 2; Janković, Decision for Further Information 
in the Context of the Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11 bis, at 4 (Apr. 15, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-OR-65-PT, Decision for Further Information in the 
Context of the Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11 bis, at 3 (Feb. 9, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision for Further Information in the Context of 
the Prosecutor’s Request Under Rule 11 bis, at 3 (Feb. 9, 2005). 
120. Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to 
the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 31 (Sept. 14, 2005) 
(concluding that despite their status as commanding officers, referral of the accused was 
“not ipso facto incompatible with . . . Rule 11bis(A)”); see also Prosecutor v. Lukić & 
Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-AR11bis.1, Decision on Milan Lukić’s Appeal Regarding 
Referral, ¶¶ 25–26 (July 11, 2007) (emphasizing the more subjective element of actual 
role over the accused’s relatively low military rank given his active role in organising 
especially deadly paramilitary attacks). 
121. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 22 (July 8, 2005). 
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actual role and formal position merits international attention, 
each accused is considered separately by the bench. Some cases 
have been harder than others to decide. For instance, the 
position of Radovan Stanković as an infantry soldier facilitated 
the finding that he was not a leader in the context of Security 
Council Resolution 1503.122 By contrast, the bench in the Rašević 
and Todović referral refused to classify the two accused as 
leaders,123 and rejected the argument that the second-in-
command should be tried by the ICTY if the first-in-command is 
as well.124 The bench’s rationale in reaching this conclusion is 
not evidently clear given the brevity of the court on this point. 
Due emphasis is placed on the political role the accused 
possessed.125 The political role of an accused can distinguish a 
leader from other indictees.126 The Tribunal differentiates 
between planners and actors that execute the will of the 
planners.127 For a person to be considered a leader, they must 
hold some political role that elevates them above the other 
perpetrators.128 This informal element gains importance and 
establishes a safer mechanism for measuring individual 
responsibility because increased planning capability constitutes 
evidence of greater gravity. This element is well-thought-out and 
satisfactorily applied. 
The responsibility of the accused is judged ratione loci within 
the context of a specific territory, but the bench has not been 
consistent in its approach on locality. For instance, in Janković the 
bench did not render the accused a leader under Rule 11 bis 
 
122. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 15,19. 
123. See Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with 
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 23. 
124. See id. ¶ 19. 
125. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 
11 bis Referral, ¶ 19 (Nov. 15, 2005) (emphasizing that “[n]othing in the wording of 
11bis(C) indicates that the ‘level of responsibility’ is restricted to military responsibility to 
the exclusion of political responsibility” (emphasis added)). The appeals chamber went 
on to support this conclusion with reference to Security Council Resolution 1534, supra 
note 4. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19. 
126. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19 (ordering referral, despite 
the sub-commander position held by Janković, because he lacked a political role). 
127. See Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 26, 
31 (Dec. 17, 2004). 
128. See Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (May 17, 2005). 
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even though he held local command.129 But in the Milošević 
referral it resisted the prosecutor’s argument that Milošević was 
an “intermediate and lower-level accused”130 given his 
subservience to Mladić and Karadžić within the Army of the 
Republika Srpska.131 Instead, the bench relied on Milošević’s very 
senior role within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, a specialized unit 
of the Bosnian Serb Army.132 Unfortunatley, the Tribunal again 
did not take this opportunity to explain whether criminal 
responsibility should be measured against a particular area where 
the accused operated or whether the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia as a whole must be examined.133 The bench seems 
prepared to limit the inquiry to the local level, but, at the same 
time, did not specifically delimit the boundaries of the relevant 
territory.134 This is understandable given that each case is 
examined on its own merits.135 An a priori determination of 
relevant territories would provide a basis for exclusion of certain 
cases from the referral process. The localization of responsibility 
in a specific territory is a good indication of gravity and is 
supported by the evidence that is available to the bench. 
The nature of a particular activity, both in terms of its 
duration and substance, also bears on the true role played by an 
accused. An activity carried out over a limited period of time 
entails the risk that it may not be representative of the actual 
level of responsibility. The performance of a given role must 
extend over a substantial period of time in order to classify the 
accused as a leader.136 In addition, the degree of the activity 
weighs on the assessment of responsibility. That the accused 
 
129. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19. 
130. Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I, II, and III, , ¶ 22, 
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT (Jan. 31, 2005). 
131. See Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 21, 23 
(July 8, 2005). 
132. See id. There is little doubt as to the seniority of Dragomir Milošević; the 
defense conceded that there were 18,000 troops under his command in the Sarajevo-
Romanija Corps. See Defence’s Response to the Prosecution’s Motion Under Rule 11 bis 
and the Trial Chamber Decision of 09.02.2005, ¶¶ 16, 20, Milošević (Feb. 21, 2005). 
133. Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 21–23. 
134. See id. ¶ 23. 
135. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 47(E); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-
23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 18 (May 17, 2005). 
136. See Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 23 
(holding that the permanent nature of the position held by the accused amounted to a 
“prolonged period exceeding a year”). 
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negotiated, signed, participated in negotiations, and 
implemented various agreements is a determinant factor in 
appreciating the importance of his position.137 The specific tasks 
performed by the accused are therefore examined.138 This 
cautious approach, which evaluates actual authority shown over 
an extended period of time, ensures that the right cases will 
remain with the Tribunal for trial. In situations where the 
accused possesses the requisite authority but fails to exercise 
their power, it is hoped that the bench would discharge this 
aspect of the gravity determination. 
The level of individual criminal responsibility with which the 
accused is charged is also a factor bearing on the level of gravity. 
A commander is more likely to be a leader. An indictment 
alleging command responsibility, however, would be insufficient 
for trial in The Hague on its own.139 An examination of gravity is 
still necessary because the bench may dispute the prosecutor’s 
assessment of the alleged involvement.140 The latter, in any case, 
will be thoroughly examined at trial. Since the bench cannot 
conduct a judicial examination into the individual criminal 
responsibility, command responsibility in the indictment does 
not generally suffice for referral by itself. The bench, therefore, 
often bases its decisions on a factual interpretation of the 
accused’s role and not on the prosecutor’s assessment of 
command responsibility—which is a matter reserved for trial. No 
doubt, a more accurate determination of gravity would ensue if 
the bench entered into a judicial examination of individual 
criminal responsibility, but this would alter the fundamental 
character of the referral hearing. 
 
137. See id. 
138. See Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral 
to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 25 (Sept. 14, 
2005) (portraying Norac as holding a “lower non-strategic rank” with limited operative 
assignment and without any authority in the police or judicial matters). 
139. See Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 21 
(declaring that Milošević’s position, alone, is not “determinative”). 
140. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral 
of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (July 22, 2005) (rejecting the suggestion in the 
indictment that the accussed was a “leader” by virtue of his command power at the local 
level). This aspect of the holding was disputed on appeal, but the Appeals Chamber 
rejected the argument. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, 
Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19 (Nov. 15, 2005). 
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A similar question concerns the allegation of joint criminal 
enterprise141 in the indictment. The issue is whether such 
allegation precludes referral by being indicative of higher 
gravity.142 In the Mejakić referral the defence took the argument a 
step further and argued that “even though the crimes alleged 
directly against the accused are not the highest gravity, their 
connection to others through the device of the joint criminal 
enterprise warrants careful treatment, that can only be 
accomplished if the same Tribunal that has considered and is 
considering other aspects of this joint criminal enterprise is the 
Tribunal to hear and adjudicate this case.”143 In their view, the 
accused formed part of joint criminal enterprise with the Serb 
political authorities.144 The defense also maintained that the 
purpose of the indictment was to establish whether they are 
responsible for actions and crimes committed by others whose 
cases have been tried by the Tribunal or yet evaded arrest.145 
Although it seems sensible to try all co-perpetrators of joint 
criminal enterprise before the same court, national or 
international, the attempt to examine the Mejakić case in relation 
to other cases linked by joint criminal enterprise fails because the 
indictment alleged limited participation in the joint criminal 
enterprise.146 The bench therefore concluded that the role of the 
accused should be seen only on the basis of the particular acts 
alleged in the indictment.147 Joint criminal enterprise alone does 
not prove gravity. 
This does not mean that it could not “forestall the 
referral”148 in another case. The bench’s approach in Mejakić is 
also consistent with previous case law examining the precise role 
 
141. See Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise; Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial 
Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 606 (2004) (discussing the concept 
of joint criminal enterprise); see also Piacente, supra note 70, at 446 (same). 
142. See Mitar Rašević’s Defence Response to Prosecution’s 11 bis Motion and 
Defence’s Submission of Further Information in Accordance with the Referral Bench’s 
Decision of 14 April 2005 and in the Context of the Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11 
bis, ¶ 11, Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT (Apr. 28, 2005) 
(arguing that indictment as a co-perpetrator displays a high level of responsibility). 
143. Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion 
for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 17 (July 20, 2005). 
144. See id. ¶ 22. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. ¶ 23. 
147. See id. ¶ 24. 
148. See id. ¶ 25. 
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of the accused.149 The limited input of the accused is balanced 
against the willingness of the panel to examine the bigger 
picture. The outcome could be different if the role of the 
accused in joint criminal enterprise would meaningfully 
influence the outcome of other cases or as the bench put it, if 
other trials tried before the Tribunal “will have significant 
implications for [the Mejakić] trial.”150 The fact that it did not is 
key to the referral decision. The bench did not dispute the 
existence of joint criminal enterprise nor the degree of 
participation alleged by the prosecutor in the indictment and did 
not enter a judicial finding. This is in contrast to the approach 
taken on superior responsibility.151 Despite its importance, joint 
criminal enterprise should be seen as another form of individual 
criminal responsibility.152 It is therefore hard to see why it should 
be treated differently from command responsibility. Insofar as all 
co-perpetrators equally participate in the commission of the same 
serious crimes, the approach would be correct. But the approach 
is misplaced in any other situation and the gravity requirement 
would be harmed as a result. 
The element of gravity is central to Rule 11 bis. Of the two 
elements in Rule 11 bis, gravity can be determined solely on the 
bench’s assessment without any consideration of the situation on 
the ground in a given state. If lower gravity is upheld, the bench 
may proceed with the rest of the elements contained in the rule. 
If, on the other hand, the accused is determined to be a serious 
leader, then the case remains with the Tribunal. To facilitate this 
task, the bench has devised some objective tests to measure 
gravity. Those tests may ease the burden, but do not fully 
delimitate the contours of gravity. A more inquisitive approach 
could perhaps go a step further and allow a more in-depth 
examination of the issues surrounding gravity. Nevertheless, the 
approach chosen by the bench, curtailed by the nonexamination 
of evidence, emphasises the limited scope of the referral process 
 
149. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (May 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, 
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (July 22, 2005). 
150. Id. 
151. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
152. See Piacente, supra note 70, at 449. But see Shane Darcy, An Effective Measure of 
Bringing Justice?: The Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 153, 176 (2004). 
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and forms testament to the pragmatic approach assumed by the 
bench. Such an approach could provide useful insight for other 
courts, such as the ICC, which may be guided by ICTY 
jurisprudence when adopting their own standards on gravity. 
D. Which State? 
Once the bench determines that the indictment is suitable 
for a referral under Rule 11 bis(C), the next step is to identify an 
appropriate state to receive the referral in order to proceed with 
the trial. The ICTY prosecutor, apart from initiating the referral 
process by motion, is also entitled to formally request referral to 
a particular state.153 The bench, however, may also act proprio 
motu and refer the indictment to a state different from the one 
requested by the prosecutor.154 
If a request for referral is upheld, the indictment is 
transferred to a “national” jurisdiction.155 This is understood to 
carry the ordinary meaning of all courts pertaining to a nation.156 
Referrals under Rule 11 bis to international courts such as the 
ICC or the Sierra Leone Special Court are therefore not 
envisaged. The referral bench decides which state will receive the 
indictment, but not which court within that jurisdiction will 
 
153. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B); see also Janković, Decision on Referral 
of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 23 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-
PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 39 
(July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 31 (July 8, 
2005). 
154. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(D)(i); see also Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, 
Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 27 (Apr. 12, 2006) (explaining that a referral proprio motu may only take 
place if there are significant problems with referral of the case to the state requested by 
the prosecution); Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 26 (same). 
The bench in this instance unnecessarily self-restricts the discretion that it enjoys to alter 
the state of referral and is in contravention with the rule itself. 
155. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B) (requiring the accused to be “handed 
over to the authorities of [a] State”). 
156. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case 
under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 26 (May 17, 2005). The defense in the Stanković referral argued that 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina War Crimes Chamber could not be considered a national 
court it is not comprised exclusively of judges who are nationals of the state. See 
Defence’s Motion in Accordance with Rule 11 bis(B), ¶¶ 26–27, Stanković (Dec. 22, 
2002). The referral bench correctly determined that the use of international jurists on a 
state’s courts does not impact or affect its national character. Stanković, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 26. 
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ultimately hear the case, nor what law will be applied.157 However, 
some discussion of specific courts may be inevitable in making 
the determination on the suitability of a state.158 Rule 11 bis(B), 
for instance, directs the Tribunal to examine the possibility of 
receiving a fair trial under the applicable law.159 
Rule 11 bis(A) sanctions three states as potential recipients 
of the indictment: the state in which the crime was committed, 
the state of arrest, or any state “willing and adequately prepared 
to accept” the indictment.160 The prosecutor has consistently 
argued that the criteria in Rule 11 bis(A) reflect preferential 
ordering among competing States which gives the greatest weight 
to the State in whose territory the crime was committed under 
Rule 11 bis(A)(i).161 The greater importance of the territorial 
state suggests an underlying hierarchy embedded in Rule 11 
bis(A).162 A textual interpretation of the relevant provision does 
not support this contention. The various options in Rule 11 
bis(A) are listed in the alternative. The territorial state may be 
mentioned first, but there is no indication that this should be 
chosen to the exclusion of the other two options. The bench in 
the Mejakić referral, using somewhat unclear language, dismissed 
the hierarchy argument but suggested that potential states are 
ranked in “descending priority.”163 This does not seem far from 
the prosecutor’s position. Both accept that there is an order 
implicit in the rule, but they differ in the significance allocated to 
 
157. See Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Referral 
of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A and Annex B, ¶ 44 (Apr. 5, 
2007); see also Ljubičić, Decision on Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 
bis, ¶ 47 (July 4, 2006). 
158. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 22. 
159. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B). 
160. Id. R. 11 bis(A). 
161. See, e.g., Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I and II 
and Confidential Annexes III and IV, ¶ 6, Prosecutor v. Rašević, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT 
(Nov. 4, 2005); Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis for Referral of the 
Indictment to Another Court, ¶ 6, Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT (July 19, 
2005); Motion by the Proscutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I, II, III, and 
Confidential Annexes IV, V, and VI, ¶ 6, Prosecutor v. Todović, Case No. IT-97-25 (Nov. 
1, 2004); Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis: Partly Confidential (Confidential 
Annexes II and III), ¶ 8, Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT (Sept. 2, 2004). 
162. See Ljubičić, Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 25 (Apr. 12, 2006) (summarizing the prosecutor’s argument for 
establishing a hierarchy within Rule 11 bis(A)). 
163. Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40 (July 20, 2005). 
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the state on whose territory the crime was allegedly committed. 
Although the bench recognized the importance of the 
territoriality principle, the judges concluded that there is no 
established priority assigned to territoriality.164 However, the 
articulation of the bench’s position was not unequivocal, leaving 
the door open for the prosecutor to repeat the hierarchy 
argument in subsequent cases.165 Perhaps the clearest expression 
of the Tribunal’s position on hierarchy came in the Janković 
appeal.166 The chamber discussed the discretion that the referral 
bench is vested with to determine referrals “without establishing 
any hierarchy among [the Rule 11 bis(A)] three options.”167 The 
bench rejected the hierarchy argument and emphasised that the 
task to allocate a case to the competent state for trial is solely 
based on the facts of each case, examined against the criteria of 
Rule 11 bis(A).168 Preference is not bestowed by the Tribunal on 
the territorial state. The standard is instead set at the 
“significantly greater nexus” that a state possesses over any other 
possible referral states.169 When there are competing 
jurisdictions, the bench will refer a case to the state with the 
greatest nexus to the accused.170 
 
164. See id. 
165. See Ljubičić Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 25, 28; see also Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, 
Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A and 
Annex B, ¶ 37 (Apr. 5, 2007). 
166. Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11 bis 
Referral, ¶ 33 (Nov. 15, 2005). The Bench reaffirmed this position in the Mejakić and 
Ljubičić appeals as well. Ljubičić, Decision on Appeal Against Decision on Referral, ¶ 13 
(July 4, 2006); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint 
Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40 (Apr. 7, 2006). 
167. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 33; see also Mejakić, Decision on 
Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 44; Lukić & 
Lukić, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A 
and Annex B, ¶ 37; Ljubičić Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 28; Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of 
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40. 
168. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 33; see also Mejakić, Decision on 
Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 44; Lukić & 
Lukić, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A 
and Annex B, ¶ 37; Ljubičić, Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 28; Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of 
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40. 
169. Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 37. 
170. See id.; see also Ljubičić ,Trial Decision, ¶ 29 (focusing on the “weaker” nexus of 
a requested state to deny referral to that jurisdiction). 
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Criminal jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality is found in 
Rule 11 bis(A)(i).171 This provision confers jurisdiction on a state 
in whose territory the crime was committed.172 There are two 
possible interpretations of the principle of territoriality from 
Rule 11 bis. The first is that the notion of territory would 
correspond to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and 
referrals under this option would take place in any of the states 
that emerged from the break up of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in 1991. This would be an incorrect assertion. All of 
the states which emerged in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 
acquired international recognition before the ICTY was even 
established.173 An interpretation that included the entire territory 
of the former Yugoslavia would infringe upon the sovereignty of 
these states. The other, more suitable interpretation would 
consider the individual territories of the emerged states. For 
example, if the crime occurred in Sarajevo, the relevant territory 
would be that of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the crimes 
committed around Knin, the territorial state would be Croatia 
and so on. 
Besides territoriality, Rule 11 bis also provides for referral to 
the state where the accused was arrested.174 This state may not be 
identical to the territorial state. The link with the state of arrest 
might be tentative and limited to the fact that the person was 
merely present within that territory at the time of the arrest. 
Interestingly, Rule 11 bis(A)(ii) does not require an examination 
into whether the custodial state would be willing to try the 
person, nor whether its legal system would be able to accept the 
case.175 From a practical perspective, there may not be national 
legislation granting jurisdiction on the basis of custody or even 
 
171. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A)(i). Rule 11 bis(A)(i) is widely used 
primarily due to the practical advantage it offers regarding easy access to evidence and 
witnesses. 
172. Id. R. 11 bis(A)(i). 
173. Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina became members of the United 
Nations on May 22, 1992, and Macedonia became a member on April 8, 1993. See U.N. 
Member States, List of Member States U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.A/295/Add.5 (Oct. 6, 
2006), available at http://secint50.un.org/members/list.shtml. The ICTY Statute was 
subsequently adopted on May 25, 1993. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra 
note 19. 
174. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A)(ii). 
175. See id. 
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criminalizing the acts in question.176 Yet, if referred, the state 
would have to accept the indictment and proceed with trial 
because the ICTY is a creation of the Security Council acting 
under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which renders its 
decisions binding on all U.N. member states.177 Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that the referral bench would transfer an indictment to 
an unwilling or incapable forum. Even though the “willing and 
adequately prepared” analysis does not form part of Rule 11 
bis(A)(i) and (ii) inquiry, it may, however, come under the fair 
trial requirement of Rule 11 bis(B).178 When discussing referral to 
the state of arrest, some examination of the legal system would be 
desirable so as to guarantee successful trial after referral. An 
amendment of Rule 11 bis to reflect this should, therefore, be 
considered. 
An altogether different challenge is faced by voluntary 
surrenders. In the context of Rule 11 bis, it is of interest to 
examine whether the state that the person voluntarily surrenders 
within may be equated with the state of arrest for the purposes of 
referral. At the inception of ad hoc tribunals, few would have 
thought that voluntary surrenders would become such an 
effective means of bringing the alleged perpetrators to The 
Hague.179 Fear of “detention” by the SFOR in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina led to a number voluntarily surrenders.180 The 
 
176. See Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, ¶¶ 40, 56, Letter 
dated 17 June 2002 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 (June 19, 2002). 
177. See U.N. Charter art. 48. 
178. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 
11 bis Referral, ¶ 40 (Nov. 15, 2005) (noting that “[a]s a strictly textual matter, Rule 11 
bis(A)[(ii)] does not require that the jurisdiction be ‘willing and adequately prepared to 
accept’ a transferred case,” but that the analysis is implicit in Rule 11 bis(B)). 
179.  See John B. Allock, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, in CONFRONTING THE YUGOSLAV CONTROVERSIES 346, 368–78 (Charles 
Ingrao & Thomas A. Emmert eds., 2009); VOJIN DIMITRIJEVIC, SILAZENJE S UMA 
[LOSING MIND] 318–19, 389 (2006) (Serb.); see also Julija Bogoeva, Odgovornost za 
zlocine [Responsibility for the Crimes], REPUBLIKA, No. 169-170 (1997), available at 
http://www.yurope.com/zines/republika/arhiva/97/170/170_22.HTM. See 
generally VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS (2008). 
180. See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 24, ¶ 222; see also JOHN HAGAN, 
JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL 108 (2003) 
(quoting a legal advisor in the prosecutor’s office as stating that the accused became 
aware “that there was an easy way and a hard way to come here,” particularly after the 
death and injury of Drjlaća and Kupreškić during their arrests); RACHEL KERR, THE 
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policy of the moderate Serbian government during the period of 
2004–2008 also promoted a number of voluntary surrenders in 
exchange for special benefits.181 The ten individuals indicted in 
the Kordić and Kupsreškić cases were the first accused to surrender 
voluntarily182 and many more followed. Be it the change in the 
scene on the ground or the exercise of political pressure, 
voluntary surrenders became common.183 It was thus argued in 
some referral hearings, that the surrender of the accused to 
national authorities referral to that state suitable on the basis that 
it was the custodial state.184 The bench is yet to address this 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA; AN EXERCISE IN 
LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY 170 (2004) (quoting a Stabilization Force spokesperson 
as remarking that “SFOR at the door . . . may be bad for your health”). 
181. The Serbian government under the leadership by Vojislav Koštunica 
introduced the so-called “system of voluntary surrender,” which offered significant 
financial benefits to those who surrendered on their own accord. See Zakon o pravima 
optuženog u pritvoru Međunarodnog Krivičnog Tribunala i članova njegove porodice 
[Law on the Rights of the Accused in Custody of the International Criminal Tribunal 
and Members of Their Families], Službeni glasnik S.R. Srbije [Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Serbia] br. 35/2004, Mar. 30, 2004 (Serb.), available at 
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/files/lat/pdf/zakoni/2004/pdf_015_1469-04_lat.zip. This 
law was challenged before the Constitutional Court of Serbia and its application was 
suspended only fifteen days after its adoption pursuant to an interim decision of the 
court on April 15, 2004. See Odluku Ustavni sud Republike Srbije [Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Serbia], br. IU-152/2004, Apr. 15, 2004, Službeni glasnik S.R. Srbije 
br. 42/2004, Apr 15, 2004 (Serb.). The court, however, never reached a final decision 
on the matter. Despite these complications, indictees who surrendered were still 
awarded substantial compensation from “private sources.” See N. Čaluković & N. M. 
Jovanović, Za predaju do pola miliona evra [Up to Half Million Euros for Surrender], BLIC 
ONLINE (Belgrade), Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.blic.rs/stara_arhiva/politika/81406/za-
predaju-do-pola-miliona-evra. This system led to the surrender of a number of senior 
military and civilian officials, including Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, General 
Pavkovic; Chief of the Third Army, General Lazarevic; Chief of Kosovo Police, General 
Lukic; and the Minister of Interior of the Republic of Srpska, Mico Stanisic. See VESNA 
PETROVIĆ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 2005, at 462–63 (2006). There 
was a previous wave of voluntary surrenders of Serbian high officials in 2002 and 2003 
following the adoption of the Directive on the Assistance to ICTY Indictees. See Nenad lj. 
Stefanovic, Haski Uskrs [Easter in the Hague], VREME (Belgrade), Apr. 25, 2002, at 14 
(identifying the President of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic; President of the 
Republic of Serpska Krajina, Milan Martic; and Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, 
Nikola Sainovic as individuals who recently surrendered). 
182. See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 24, at ¶ 113. 
183. The transfers of indictees to The Hague from Serbia was a highly political 
issue due to the animosity towards the ICTY. See PETROVIĆ, supra note 181, at 462–63, 
473. 
184. See Transcript of Record at 130, Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-
96-23/2-PT (Mar. 4, 2005) (arguing at a Rule 11 bis motion hearing that “he personally 
surrendered in Serbia and therefore meets the 11 bis criteria”); see also Serbia and 
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argument, but it is unlikely that this position would be tenable if 
the surrender was accomplished without any state involvement. 
This is not to say that the involvement of the state must only 
occur through its criminal justice system. Using Serbia as an 
example, political measures, such as the adoption of incentive-
based laws, threats of imminent arrest, and other coercive 
methods, led to a wave of surrenders.185 In that case, the line 
separating arrest from surrender is very vague, and the state of 
arrest is thus put on par with that of surrender. It is hard to 
foresee that the referral bench would in any case transfer the 
indictment to the state of arrest if it is not willing and able to 
accept it in practice. The state of arrest could therefore have 
been omitted altogether, as the same outcome could have been 
achieved through application of Rule 11 bis(A)(iii), which is 
examined next. 
Of the elements in Rule 11 bis, subsection (A)(iii) is perhaps 
the most interesting. By virtue of the provision, the referral 
bench may refer the indictment to the authorities of the state 
“having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared 
to accept such a case.”186 This provision underscores the 
universality of international criminal justice and guarantees the 
involvement of more states, which, if applied consistently, would 
enhance uniformity. Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) therefore leaves open the 
possibility of referrals to states which have no link to either the 
alleged crime(s) or the accused. Nevertheless, the referral bench 
cannot select a state for referral under Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) blindly. 
Under this provision a state must have jurisdiction over the 
crimes charged and be willing and capable to receive the 
indictment.187 The rule does not, however, specify the type of 
jurisdiction required.188 This would theoretically encompass a 
system as broad as universal jurisdiction. In short, trial may occur 
in any state under Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) so long as a willing and 
capable forum is available, regardless of where and by whom the 
crime was committed. 
 
Montenegro’s Submission in the Proceedings Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 5, Prosecutor v. 
Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT (Jan. 14, 2005) (submitting that “arrest of the accused 
should be equaled with voluntary surrender” for purposes of Rule 11 bis). 
185. See supra notes 180–81. 
186. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A)(iii). 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
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The rule does not elaborate upon the meaning of 
willingness and capacity, nor does it contain any indication as to 
how these requirements are measured.189 Both concepts are 
reminiscent of the ICC complementarity regime undner which 
national fora must be “willing and able” genuinely to deal with a 
case.190 This provision of Rule 11 bis was inserted after the 
adoption of the Rome Statute,191 so the influence of the latter is 
evident. Nevertheless, Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) differs significantly from 
article 17 of the Rome Statute, the main provision on 
complementarity. On a purely textual level, Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) 
utilizes the phrase “adequately prepared” as opposed to the 
equivalent term “able” in the Rome Statute.192 But the distinction 
is not simply linguistic. In examining “willingness” the bench 
does not seek to determine whether there is an attempt by the 
state to thwart trial,193 but whether the state has affirmatively 
expressed an interest in exercising jurisdiction over a case.194 
There is a fundamental difference in the underlying motive. 
When examining ability, the aim of the bench is to determine 
whether a state’s legal system could cope with the indictment in 
terms of the existing legislation, adequate procedures, and, more 
generally, the capacity to undertake the main trial.195 Capability 
in Rule 11 bis is therefore closer to the “otherwise unavailable” 
concept found in article 17(3) of the Rome Statute, which covers 
wider issues of unavailability.196 Moreover, the formulation in 
Rule 11 bis(A) differs from complementarity in its fundamental 
conception. Unlike complementarity, the ICTY examines a 
 
189. See id. 
190. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, pmbl. ¶ 10, arts. 1, 17. 
191. Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) was adopted on June 10, 2004. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, 
R. 11 bis(A)(iii). 
192. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 17, with ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 
11 bis(A)(iii). 
193. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 17(2) (indicating what constitutes 
“unwilling”). 
194. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 36, 39–42 (July 20, 2005). 
195. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 27, 45 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-
96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 21 (May 17, 2005). 
196. See Timothy L.H. McCormack & Sue Robertson, Jurisdictional Aspects of the 
Rome Statute for the New International Criminal Court, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 635, 645 (1999); 
see also Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, Decision on Rule 11 bis, 
¶¶ 16–17 (Aug. 30, 2006) (discussing Norway’s unavailability). 
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domestic legal system for purposes of Rule 11 bis not to decide 
whether a case ought to be removed from the national forum but 
to determine whether the indictment may be sent to that state for 
trial.197 The rule in this instance places more trust in the national 
legal system at a conceptual level, notwithstanding the primacy 
exerted by the statute of the Tribunal itself over the crimes in 
question.198 
Within this framework, Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) is potentially 
applicable to a large number of states. Despite nationality finding 
a prominent place in both national and international 
conceptions of jurisdiction,199 it is not found in Rule 11 bis. 
Nevertheless, states will sometimes invoke Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) in 
order to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving their own 
nationals.200 Curiously, these states focus their arguments on 
diplomatic protection.201 Diplomatic protection, although linked, 
 
197. See supra notes 25–30 (juxtaposing the terms “referral” and “deferral” as they 
are used in international jurisprudence). 
198. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 19, art. 9 (noting the 
Tribunal’s primacy within the concurrent jurisdiction structure). 
199. See Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in I THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 583, 609–10 
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (highlighting that article 12 of the Rome Statute has 
been incorporated into in the criminal code of all states comprising the former 
Yugoslavia); S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 91–92 (Sept. 7) 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (discussing public international law within the context of the 
passive personality principle rather than a citizen’s nationality); see also IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303–04 (7th ed. 2008) (providing a brief 
overview of the nationality principle in modern public international law since the time 
of S.S. “Lotus”). 
200. See Serbia and Montenegro’s Submission in the Proceedings Under Rule 11 
bis, ¶ 7, Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT (Jan. 14, 2005) (arguing that a state 
holds “special rights and responsibilities” over its nationals as parens patriae); see also Savo 
Todovic’s Defence Notie on the Serbia and Montenegro Willingness to Accept the Case 
of Savo Todovic Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 3, Prosecutor v. Rašević and Todović, Case No. IT-
97-25/1-PT (May 5, 2005) (using citizenship as an additional basis for referral). 
201. See Serbia and Montenegro’s Submission in the Proceedings Under Rule 11 
bis, ¶ 7, Mejakić; see also Defence Further Submission Regarding Gojko Jankovic’s 
Citizenship, ¶ 2, Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT (advancing the 
outrageous argument that the accused is not a citizen of Serbia and Montenegro but 
fulfils all the preconditions to be one). The bench has so far not seriously examined the 
issue of nationality as it relates to jurisdiction. See Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case 
No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential 
Annexes I and II, ¶ 32 (July 8, 2005) (noting the Bench was seized of the matter but 
ostensibly favoring an approach that takes into account whether there is a genuine link); 
see also Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 24–26 (Apr. 6) (first 
case to require a genuine connection); Report of the International Law Commission to the 
General Assembly, 57 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 173–76, U.N. Doc. A/57/10 (2002) 
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is ancillary to nationality and involves taking over a national’s 
claim against a state for a wrongful act suffered by the national 
before an international tribunal.202 This bears no relevance to a 
Rule 11 bis procedure as there is no damage suffered by an 
individual that would require protection from another state. It is 
hard to see how diplomatic protection can fit with Rule 11 bis 
given the nature of the criminal process. 
Nevertheless, the absence of nationality as a possible 
jurisdictional principle in Rule 11 bis(A) is striking. Most 
perpetrators originally shared common Yugoslav nationality. But 
since the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the emergence of separate independent states 
within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, the accused possess 
different nationalities, which may explain the absence of the 
principle from Rule 11 bis. All crimes committed in the territory 
of the conflict would in any case be covered under the principle 
of territoriality.203 The absence of jurisdiction based on 
nationality is not insurmountable; the bench is free to send the 
indictment elsewhere on the basis of Rule 11 bis(A)(iii).204 The 
same may be said for the passive personality principle,205 another 
important principle of jurisdiction, which is equally missing from 
Rule 11 bis. 
As regards the potential state for referral, Rule 11 bis(A) 
adopts a pragmatic approach that takes into account the practical 
situation on the ground. That territoriality takes precedence in 
practice is not surprising. However, referring most indictments to 
a single state and potentially to the same court (usually the War 
Crimes Court in Bosnia and Herzegovina) is likely to overwhelm 
 
(noting that the International Law Commission did not include a genuine link 
requirement and that Nottebohm should be limited to its facts by virtue of the changing 
needs of today’s globalized world). 
202. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30); Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16 (Feb. 28); see also Report of the International Law Commission to the 
General Assembly, 58 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 81, U.N. Doc. A/58/10 (2003) 
(“Diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or other means of 
peaceful settlement by a state adopting in its own right the cause of its national in 
respect of an injury to that national arising from an internationally wrongful act of 
another state.”). 
203. See supra notes 171–73. 
204. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A)(iii). 
205. See BROWNLIE, supra note 199, at 304; Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive 
Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 14–30 (1993). 
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the state of referral. The latter is then required to turn around 
cases—which would have taken many years before the ICTY—
without access to similar budget, staff, or resources.206 For 
example, the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which 
the majority of the referred cases were transferred, had 275 
pending cases in April of 2008.207 The court only has eight 
available courtrooms208 and an annual budget of just under €5.5 
million,209 in comparison to the Tribunal’s biannual budget of 
€347.5 million.210 
The preeminence of the state of arrest in Rule 11 bis 
adjudication over other more established principles of 
jurisdiction remains striking. This perhaps caters to the practical 
reality of dealing with international criminals who flee the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia. The ambit of the rule is 
nevertheless expanded through the operation of Rule 11 
bis(A)(iii).211 So far, however, the bench has taken a conservative 
approach and referred all but one indictment to the territorial 
state, as requested by the prosecutor.212 It is understandable why 
the bench has not ventured out to states unrelated to the 
conflict. Should the bench decide that certain cases could be 
more appropriately dealt with elsewhere, the possibility at least 
 
206. See Katie Zoglin, The Future of War Crimes Prosecutions in the Former Yugoslavia: 
Accountability or Junk Justice?, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 41, 72 (2005). 
207. See SUD BOSE I HERCEGOVINE [SUD BIH] [COURT OF BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA], BROJ PREDMETA ODJELIMA I I II KRIVIČNOG ODJELJENJA SUDA BOSNE I 
HERCEGOVINE DO 30. APRILA 2008 [NUMBER OF CASES BEFORE SECTIONS I AND II OF THE 
CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE STATE COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS OF APRIL 30, 
2008], http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/statistika/2008-04-30/
Broj_predmeta_pred_Odjelima_I_i_II_-_april_2008.pdf. 
208. See SUD BIH, ISKORIŠTENOST SUDNICA PREMA BROJU DANA U MJESECU DO 30. 
APRIL 2008 [UTILIZATION OF COURTROOMS BROKEN DOWN BY MONTH AS OF APRIL 30, 
2008], http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/statistika/2008-04-30/
Iskoristenost_sudnica_prema_broju_dana_u_mjesecu_-_april_2008.pdf. 
209. See Sud BiH, Office of Public Relations (PIOS): Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=7&id=15&jezik=b (last visited Feb. 20, 
2010) (listing the court’s annual budget for 2009). 
210. See Fifth Comm., Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/62/599 (Dec. 24, 2007). 
211. See supra notes 186–98(displaying the wide discretion of the bench to refer an 
indictment to potentially any state that meets certain criteria). 
212. Vladimir Kovačević’s indictment was the only one not referred on the grounds 
of territoriality. See Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Decision on Referral 
of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential and Partly Ex Parte Annexes (Nov. 17, 
2006). 
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remains. The ICTY experience gained from this part of the 
process could benefit the ICC when it examines the suitability of 
national fora as part of its decision on complementarity. Despite 
its similarities with Rule 11 bis, the ICC process differs in the 
nature of the complementarity determination. Another 
difference lies in the presence of the nationality principle for 
conferring jurisdiction and the potentially larger number of 
states that would need to be considered when examining 
complementarity. Rule 11 bis precedent may prove useful in 
terms of process and methods used to make such determinations. 
II. APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
As the purpose of the referral hearing is to examine the 
suitability of an indictment for referral, the bench recognizes 
that it does not possess the competent authority to decide in any 
binding way what law will be applied at the national level once a 
referral is upheld.213 This authority rests with the courts of the 
state the indictment is referred to. Although the bench has 
refuted any suggestion that an obligation to determine the 
applicable substantive law exists,214 it has nevertheless considered 
potentially applicable law in each of the cases it has examined to 
date. The bench has not felt the need to ground this in the RPE. 
A discussion on substantive law is necessary primarily for two 
reasons. First, under Rule 11 bis(B), the referral bench needs to 
satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial and that the 
death penalty will not be imposed.215 Such a determination 
 
213. See Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the Case to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 31 (Apr. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision 
on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 45 (Apr. 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case 
No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia 
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 32, (Sept. 14, 2005); Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-
23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 27 (July 22, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for 
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 43 (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević & 
Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with 
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 34 (July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-
96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 32 (May 17, 2005). 
214. See Mejakić, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 46, 48 (addressing arguments alleging the referral bench had 
erred in refraining from determining the controlling law and the bench’s response). 
215. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B); Somers, supra note 51, at 182. 
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cannot be made in the abstract. To the extent that fulfilment of 
these two criteria above may only be determined through a 
limited examination of applicable law, the referral bench is 
entitled to look into all available options.216 However, the bench’s 
findings are not binding on the state to which the case is referred 
and are, in any event, limited.217 Second, although this has not 
arisen in the ICTY jurisprudence, there is an inherent need to 
examine the applicable substantive law when considering 
referrals pursuant to Rule 11 bis(A)(iii), particularly in order to 
decide whether the capability requirement is met.218 The absence 
of adequate legislation would hinder or arguably preclude 
acceptance of the indictment. Moreover, given that Rule 11 bis 
does not provide criteria to assist the bench with its decision on 
capability, an examination of substantive law should not be 
precluded, although this is not explicitly envisaged in Rule 11 
bis(A)(i) and (ii). It would be interesting to see whether the 
bench would engage in a more detailed discussion of substantive 
law, if it were to decide upon a referral proprio motu.219 In such an 
instance, the bench, in lieu of the prosecutor, would have to 
make a case for referral to a particular state, which would in all 
likelihood require arguments in favour of the suitability of the 
forum. 
The aim of the bench is to satisfy itself that an adequate 
legal framework would be in place enabling prosecution of the 
accused who, if found guilty, will be appropriately punished.220 
The bench therefore limits its examination to those aspects of 
substantive law that would assist it in making the above 
determination. Accordingly, the bench does not seek to prove or 
disprove the prosecutorial or defense submissions. Instead, 
consideration is given to what seems to be the “apparent 
position” on substantive law to determine whether a referral 
order may be proceeded with.221 No indication is given as to what 
 
216. See Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 43. 
217. See id. 
218. See McCormack & Robertson, supra note 196, at 645–46. 
219. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B). 
220. See id. 
221. See Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the Case to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 32 (Apr. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the 
Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 38 (Sept. 14, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
BEKOU_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  2:51 PM 
2010] AN EXAMINATION OF RULE 11 BIS OF THE ICTY 765 
the bench considers to be the apparent position or how it makes 
this determination. 
National courts to which indictments are referred bear 
exclusive responsibility regarding the determination of the 
applicable substantive law and will have to make some difficult 
decisions post referral. Conscious of its limited mandate, the 
bench does not wish to trespass on what is inherently a domestic 
function.222 Had a more in-depth analysis of the conflicting 
provisions beyond the mere exposition of the law been 
undertaken, the bench would have been able to provide clearer 
guidance to the national courts regarding the law to be applied. 
Moreover, national prosecutions would benefit from such expert 
legal analysis by the Tribunal. However, a more substantial 
examination of applicable law would defy the main aim of the 
referral process, which is to reduce the Tribunal’s burden in light 
of the completion strategy. Such an undertaking would have 
taken up precious resources, and would not have been consistent 
with the nature of Rule 11 bis as an important weapon in the 
battle against time. A detailed examination of applicable 
substantive law after the referral of the indictment would be 
beyond the scope of this Article, but some potential problems 
that national courts may face will be briefly examined. 
The first question is what law would apply. The bench has 
adopted an almost identical approach on this issue in the 
indictments it has examined to date. As the law applicable at the 
time the crimes were committed, following the break-up of the 
former Yugoslavia, no longer applies, national courts will have to 
determine the applicable law with due regard to the principle of 
legality.223 While this principle recognizes that the applicable law 
 
Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 23 
(July 22, 2005); Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant 
to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 48; Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 37 (May 17, 2005). 
222. See Somers, supra note 51, at 182. 
223. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 
Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, 2061 A-2889 U.N.T.S. 12. A 
consolidated copy of the amended treaty is electronically available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/
englishanglais.pdf. All states of the former Yugoslavia are parties to the convention. See 
Council of Eur., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
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Freedoms CETS No.: 005, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF=05/03/2010&CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
The courts from the region took diverse approaches. While Serbian courts tend to apply 
the basic Criminal Law of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”), Krivični 
zakon socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije [Criminal Code of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] [hereinafter SFRY Criminal Code], Službeni list 
Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije [Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia] br. 36/1977, July 15, 1977, translated in LAWYERS COMM. FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, NATIONAL COURTS, AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 22–23, 
25–33 (1995), Bosnian courts did not take a firm position on this matter. Compare 
Okruzni sud Beograd [Belgrade District Court], Indictment Against Miroljub Vujović et 
al., No. KTZR 4/03 (Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/
html_trz/optuznice/o_2005_09_16_eng.pdf (applying the Criminal Code of the SFRY 
for an offense committed prior to 1992), with Okruzni sud Beograd, Indictment Against 
Slobodan Medić et al., No. KTRZ 3/05 (July 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/optuznice/o_2006_10_09_eng.pdf (applying 
the criminal code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for offenses committed after 
1992). The State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”) has applied the Criminal 
Code of BiH, Krivični zakon Bosne i Hercegovine [Criminal Code of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina] [hereinafter BiH Criminal Code], Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine 
[Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina], br. 37/2003, Nov. 22, 2003, translated at 
http://www.anti-trafficking.gov.ba/fajlovi/kazeneni_zakon_bh.pdf-.pdf, but other 
courts in the Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH, the two political entities of 
BiH, have applied the basic criminal code of the SFRY, supra. See, e.g., Humanitarian 
Law Cntr., Nacionalna suđenja za ratne zločine—Bosna i Hercegovina [National Trial 
for War Crimes—Bosnia and Herzegovina], http://www.hlc-rdc.org/PravdaIReforma/
Sudjenje-za-ratne-zlocine/SudjenjaZaRatne-Nacionalna-sudjenja-za-ratne-zlocine/
Sudjenje-za-ratne-nacionalna-BiH/151.sr.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (discussing 
indictement on January 30, 2001 of Ranko Jakovljević in the District Court of Banja Luka 
in accordance with the Criminal Code of the Republic of Srpska—which was renamed 
Criminal Code of SFRY). With the decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in Abduladhim Maktouf, by which it determined that the application of the 
BiH Criminal Code is consistent with the principle of legality, these discrepancies in 
application of the law before different courts in the same state should be resolved. See 
Odluku Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine [Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina], br. AP-1785/06, Mar. 30, 2007 (Abduladhim Maktouf), available at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=73135. It should be noted that 
all cases referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina are tried in accordance with the BiH 
Criminal Code. See, e.g., Sud Bosne i Hercegovine [Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina], 
br. X-KRŽ-05/70, Mar 28, 2007 (Stanković). Croatian courts, on the other hand, apply 
the Penal Code of Croatia, Kazneni zakon Republike Hrvatske [Penal Code of the 
Republic of Croatia], Narodne novine [Official Gazette] br. 110/2003, Nov. 20, 2003 
[hereinafter Croatia Penal Code], as it existed at the time when the crimes were 
committed. See, e.g., Županijskom Sudu u Zagrebu [County Court of Zagreb], 
Optužnicu protiv Rahima Ademija i Mirka Norca [hereinafter Indictment Against 
Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac], br. K-DO-349/05 (Nov. 22, 2006), available at 
http://ivojosipovic.com/knjige/odgovornost/pdf/D/4.%20OPTUZNICE/
06.%20Optuznica%20Norac-Ademi.pdf. In Serbia, the Special Prosecutor for War 
Crimes bases his charges on the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of the SFRY, 
supra, in force at the time the crimes were comitted. See, e.g., Okruzni sud Beogard 
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is that which was in force at the time of the commission of the 
crime, it also allows for retrospective application of posterior law, 
if the latter is more lenient. All sides to the referral hearing have 
presented arguments based on varying interpretations of the 
principle,224 but the bench has so far refrained from indicating its 
position on the matter. The absence of a “judicially established 
test” for the determination of leniency has been noted by the 
bench,225 which indicates that the decision on applicable law 
national courts are called to make cannot rely on preestablished 
criteria and implies that it is of considerable complexity which 
will burden the national court. 
Other areas that the bench has touched upon include the 
absence of the category of crimes against humanity in the 
legislation of the former Yugoslavia,226 the nonequivalence of the 
provisions relating to command responsibility with the ICTY 
Statute,227 the potential for direct applicability of international 
 
[Belgrade District Court], Indictment Against Vladimir Kovačević, No. KTZR 5/07 (July 
26, 2007), available at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/optuznice/
o_2007_07_26_eng.pdf. 
224. See Response of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Request 
for Further Written Submissions by the Referral Bench in the Mejakić and Stanković 
Cases at 5–6, Stanković (Mar. 22, 2005) (acknowledging the legality principle but arguing 
that the 2003 BiH Criminal Code provides a “more complete exposition of the law” and 
should therefore be applied instead). Identical arguments have been made in other 
cases. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 30; Prosecutor 
v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 
11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 37 (July 8, 2005). Depending on whether 
the 2003 code is more lenient or not, the above argument may violate the legality 
principle, if applied purely on the basis that it provides for more detailed provisions. See 
supra note 223 (outlining the principle of legality). 
225. Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion 
for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 47 (July 20, 2005). 
226. See Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 33; Stanković, 
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 38–39. Consequently, in the case of 
Ademi and Norac before the Croatian court, two counts of the ICTY indictment on crimes 
against humanity were excluded from the Croatian indictment and were converted to 
the war crime against civilian population. See Indictment Against Rahim Ademi and 
Mirko Norac, br. K-DO-349/05 (Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://ivojosipovic.com/
knjige/odgovornost/pdf/D/4.%20OPTUZNICE/06.%20Optuznica%20Norac-
Ademi.pdf.  Crimes against humanity have been included in the adapted Bosnian 
indictments. See, e.g., Sud BiH, Indictment Against Paško Ljubičić, No. KT-RZ-140/06 
(Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//
pasko_ljubicic_-_indictment_-_eng.pdf. 
227. See Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the Case to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 34–35 (Apr. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the 
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law as the basis for prosecution,228 the different set of penalties 
applicable then and now,229 and the existence of statute of 
limitations in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(“SFRY”) code.230 
As a supplementary element, the examination of applicable 
law aids the determination of other elements in Rule 11 bis. 
Applicable law has not, however, been discussed in any depth in 
the jurisprudence, thereby limiting its usefulness. An 
examination of the availability of an adequate legal framework 
 
Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 40–42 (Sept. 14, 2005); Mejakić, Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 15, 17; Janković, 
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 42, 43. The question of command 
responsibility is particularly interesting in the case of Ademi and Norac in Croatia. The 
Penal Code of Croatia does not contain a provision on criminal liability for command 
responsibility. See generally Croatia Penal Code, Narodne novine br. 110/2003, Nov. 20, 
2003. However, the Supreme Court of Croatia has held that criminal charges against 
commanders for failing to prevent subordinates from committing war crimes could 
possibly be based on general domestic theories of criminal liability for failure to act in 
conjunction with Articles 86 and 87 of Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See 
Rješenje Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske [Supreme Court of Croatia], br. I K-588/02-9, 
Oct. 17, 2002 (M.S.), available at http://sudskapraksa.vsrh.hr/supra/. However, the 
second element of command responsibility for punishing subordinates is not covered by 
this decision, nor is it contained in the Ademi and Norac indictment. See Mission to 
Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, Supplementary Report: War Crime Proceedings in Croatia and Findings 
from Trial Monitoring 3–4 (June 22, 2004); see also Indictment Against Rahim Ademi and 
Mirko Norac, br. K-DO-349/05 (Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://ivojosipovic.com/
knjige/odgovornost/pdf/D/4.%20OPTUZNICE/06.%20Optuznica%20Norac-
Ademi.pdf. 
228. See Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with 
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 49(remarking that article 4a of the BiH criminal code 
requires consideration of international law); Janković, Decision on Referral of Case 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 41 (same); Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of 
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 62 (same). 
229. See Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 30, 35; 
Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 
59; Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40. The twenty years 
sentencing cap and use of the death penalty in the former Yugoslavia were replaced with 
a maximum sentence of twenty to forty-five years in the BiH criminal code. See BiH 
Criminal Code art. 42(2), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br. 37/2003, Nov. 22, 
2003, translated at http://www.anti-trafficking.gov.ba/fajlovi/kazeneni_zakon_bh.pdf-
.pdf. 
230. See Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 55; Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 41. This 
would seem to be a relatively minor problem for national courts because the SFRY 
criminal code, even if applied, would not bar offenses committed in 1992 until 2017. See 
SFRY Criminal Code art. 95(1)(1), Službeni list Socijalističke Federativne Republike 
Jugoslavije br. 36/1977, July 15, 1977. The issue, of course, would be whether national 
courts would be overwhelmed with cases that are likely to last until then. 
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and penalty structure, although of some use to the bench, 
constitutes a missed opportunity for expert assistance to be 
provided to the referral state. The bench has never intervened to 
dictate what law is to be applied, since this is exclusively a 
domestic matter. At the same time, it is called on to decide 
referrals based on this exceedingly limited scrutiny of national 
systems. The bench’s approach is a taster of the law that may be 
applied once the indictment is referred. Compared to its current 
secondary function, making substantive law an element of Rule 
11 bis, would have been of greater usefulness to states and would 
also have delivered more accurate results for the bench. The 
rule, as it stands, emphasizes how distinct the two levels of 
adjudication are and denotes the limits of the bench’s inquiry. 
An amendment of Rule 11 bis to formally include substantive law 
would have therefore been welcome. 
III. FAIR TRIAL AND SENTENCING ISSUES 
A. Fair Trial 
A prime concern of any criminal process is to ensure that 
the accused receives a fair trial. The right to fair trial is 
guaranteed in the ICTY Statute, which follows international 
standards.231 Rule 11 bis further requires the Tribunal to ensure 
that the accussed will receive a fair trial after transfer to the 
national jurisdiction.232 Fair trial issues therefore cannot be 
disregarded when deciding referrals requests.233 Where this 
element differs from other elements in Rule 11 bis is that the 
bench, at the time of the referral hearing, has very limited insight 
as to whether the accused will in fact receive fair trial after the 
 
231. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 21; see also International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra 
note 223, art. 6. 
232. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B) (mandating that the accused “will” 
get a fair trial). 
233. See Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, 
¶¶ 27–28 (Sept. 1, 2005) (acknowledging that the referral bench’s use of the word 
“should” was imprecise but holding that “should” in this instance meant “will”); Ademi 
& Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 53 (highlighting that the fair trial condition in Rule 11 bis proceedings 
requires fairness not only with regard to the accused, but also towards all interested 
parties, which includes the victims and the international community). 
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indictment has been transferred. Although this cannot be 
assessed in the abstract, the hearing offers very little scope for the 
precise determination of this requirement. The bench is 
required to make a finding on a future judicial process, over 
which it has no control. This is an arduous task given that the 
bench has limited ability to anticipate. Its examination would, 
inevitably, lie in the hypothetical sphere. For more reliable 
findings, fair trial issues should also have been revisited 
postreferral.234 At the referral stage, the bench restricts its 
assessment to determining whether an adequate legal framework 
exists in the prospective referral state and whether this legal 
structure is sufficient to guarantee fair trial.235 
In ICTY jurisprudence, both the bench and the appeals 
chamber have addressed the main concerns raised by the 
defendants in some detail. These decisions cover a number of 
issues such as the composition of the court,236 trial without undue 
delay, the right to choose one’s counsel, adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of a defence, the right to attend trial 
and examine witnesses, witness availability and protection, and 
pretrial detention on remand.237 Each of these issues will be 
examined below in turn. 
The starting point in the bench’s examination is to 
determine whether prompt trial is guaranteed in national law. 
 
234. This is partly achieved through the reporting process examined infra. 
235. The Bench has, in each case, reviewed the applicable constitutional provisions 
but also the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Codes as well as membership to 
international treaties, such as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 223. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. 
IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential 
Annex A and Annex B, ¶¶ 69–74 (Apr. 5, 2007); Prosecutor v. Janković, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 62 (July 22, 2005); Mejakić, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 68; Rašević & Todović, 
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 83; 
Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 55. 
236. Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 83–86 (showing that the defense base their arguments on the lack of 
impartiality and independence of the state court in BiH based on the criteria on the 
election of judges, the composition of the court, and the provisions on disqualification). 
237. See Lukić & Lukić, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with 
Confidential Annex A and Annex B, ¶¶ 76–97 (providing an overview of the issues 
relating to fair trial). 
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Once it has been established that it is, review of further 
provisions in more detail follows.238 
Temporally speaking, the transfer of indictments from the 
Tribunal to national courts will inevitably lead to some delay. 
Upon transfer to national courts, the indictment requires 
adaption.239 This is not usually a lengthy process. In practice, the 
state prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina needs approximately 
three months to adapt an indictment.240 The Serbian prosecutor 
 
238. See, e.g., Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 32 
(explaining the general principle that the Tribunal cannot mandate the law that will be 
applied at a national level but must examine it to ensure that there is an adequate legal 
framework to try the accused). For the relevant provisions of the code of criminal 
procedure of BiH, see Zakon krivičnom prostupku Bosne i Hercegovine [Criminal 
Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina] [hereinafter Code of Criminal Procedure 
for BiH] arts. 13, 135, 137(2), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine  br. 36/2003, Nov. 
21, 2003, translated at http://www.anti-trafficking.gov.ba/fajlovi/
Zakon_o_kazenenom_postupku_BH.pdf-14.pdf. For the relevant provisions of the code 
of criminal procedure of Croatia, see Zakon o kaznenom postupku (pročišćeni tekst) 
[Code of Criminal Procedure (revised text)] [hereinafter Code of Criminal Procedure 
for RH] arts. 10, 110–11, 114, Narodne Novine br. 62, Apr. 12, 2003. For the relevant 
provisions of the code of criminal procedure of Serbia, see Zakonik o krivičnom 
postupku [Code of Criminal Procedure] [hereinafter Code of Criminal Procedure for 
RS] arts. 16, 144, 146, Službeni glasnik S.R. Srbije br. 46/2006, May 25, 2006, translated 
at http://www.osce.org/documents/srb/2007/04/24175_en.pdf. 
239. See, e.g., Zakon o ustupanju predmeta od strane Međunarodnog krivičnog 
suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju Tužilaštvu Bosne i Hercegovine i korištenju dokaza pribavljenih 
od Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju u postupcima pred sudovima u 
Bosni i Hercegovini [Law on the Transfer of Cases from the International criminal court 
for the Former Yugoslavia to the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Use of Evidence Collected by the International criminal court for the Former Yugoslavia 
in Proceedings Before the Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina] [hereinafter BiH Transfer 
Law] art. 2(1), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br. 61/2004, Dec. 29, 2004 
(establishing the procedure for adapting a referred indictment). The national court 
adopts the indictment already prepared by the Tribunal and simply adapts it to comply 
with domestic law requirements. See id. art. 2(1). However, nothing prevents national 
authorities from adding new charges or defendants to the existing indictment. See id. art. 
2(2). Although this may lead to further delays, the prospect of further amendment is not 
fundamentally inconsistent with the right to fair trial because the discretion to amend 
filings falls within the powers of the court before which the case will be heard and is no 
different than the procedure of the ICTY. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 50. 
240. For example, the case against Radovan Stanković was referred to the Bosnian 
authorities on September 29, 2005, and the adapted indictment was adopted on 
December 7, 2005. See Mission to Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, First Report in the Case of 
Defendant Radovan Stanković Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis, at 1 (Feb. 
2006) [hereinafter First OSCE Report in Stanković], available at http://www.oscebih.org/
documents/14064-eng.pdf; see also Sud BiH, Indictment Against Radovan Stanković, No. 
KT-RZ-45/05 (Nov. 28, 2005), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/
optuznice/STANKOVIC_INDICTMENT.pdf. Gojko Janković was transferred on 
December 8, 2005, and the adapted indictment was adopted on February 20, 2006. See 
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required eight months in the case of Vladimir Kovačevič, but this 
was predominantly due to Kovačevič’s health condition.241 The 
Croatian prosecutor needed an entire year to adapt the 
indictment in the trial of Ademi and Norac and, even then, 
amended the indictment in May of 2008 after almost a year of 
trial proceedings.242 
 
Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE, First Report in the Case of Defendant Gojko 
Janković Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis, at 1 (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter 
First OSCE Report in Janković], available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/13969-
eng.pdf; see also Sud BiH, Indictment Against Gojko Janković, No. KT-RZ-163/05 (Feb. 
14, 2005), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/optuznice/
jankovic_indictment.pdf. Paško Ljubičić was transferred on September 22, 2006, and the 
adapted indictment was adopted on December 21, 2006. See Mission to Bosn. & Herz., 
OSCE, Second Report in the Paško Ljubičić Case Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to 
Rule 11bis, at 1 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/14054-
eng.pdf; see also Sud BiH, Indictment Against Paško Ljubičić, No. X-KRN-06/241 (Dec. 
15, 2006) available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//pasko_ljubicic_-
_indictment_-_eng.pdf. Željko Mejakić, Dušan Fuštar, Duško Knežević, and Momćilo 
Gruban were transferred to Bosnian authorities on May 9, 2006, and the adapted 
indictment was adopted on July 14, 2006. See Mission to Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, First 
Report in the Željko Mejakić et al. Case Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis, 
at 1 (Sept. 2006) [hereinafter First OSCE Report in Mejakić], available at 
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/14054-eng.pdf; see also Sud BiH, Indictment 
Against Željko Mejakić, Momćilo Gruban, Dušan Fuštar, Duško Knežević, No. KT-RZ-
91/06 (July 7, 2006) available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//
pasko_ljubicic_-_indictment_-_eng.pdf. 
241. Kovačević’s case was transferred on November 17, 2006, and the adapted 
indictment was released by the Serbian prosecutor for war crimes on July 30, 2007. See 
Prosecutor’s Second Progress Report at 1 n.1, ¶4, Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Case No. IT-
01-42/2-I (Sept. 5, 2007); see also Okruzni sud Beogard [Belgrade District Court], 
Indictment Against Vladimir Kovačević, No. KTZR 5/07 (July 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/optuznice/o_2007_07_26_eng.pdf. Kovačević’s 
case was adjourned due to his mental state by the decision of the special chamber of the 
Belgrade District Court on December 5, 2007. See Okruzni sud Beogard, Resenje o 
odbecivanju optuznice [Resolution of the Indictment Decision], No. KTZR 5/07, Dec. 5, 
2007, available at http://okruznisudbg.rs/content/2007godina/kovacevicvladimir/
indictment3/at_downoad. 
242. The case was referred on September 14, 2005 and the adapted indictment was 
released on November 22, 2006. See Mission to Croatia, OSCE, Background Report: 
Domestic War Crimes Proceedings 2006 (Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://www.osce.org/
documents/mc/2007/10/27566_en.pdf. The trial was concluded on May 30, 2008, with 
Ademi acquitted and Norac convicted for the war crimes against civilians on the grounds 
of command responsibility. See Presuda Županijski sud Zarebu [Zagreb County Court], 
Republike Hrvatske v. Ademi & Norac, br. II K-rz-1/06, May 30, 2008, available at 
http://www.centar-za-mir.hr/uploads/PRESUDA_Ademi_i_Norac.pdf. For a summary 
of the arguments made on appeal, see Memorandum from Office in Zagreb, OSCE, to 
Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY (Nov. 25, 2009), in Prosecutor’s Seventeenth Progress 
Report, Annex A, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, No. IT-04-78-PT (Dec. 16, 2009), 
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Another issue that may cause delays involves the transfer of 
all material from The Hague to the relevant national court. Rule 
11 bis(D)(iii) outlines the provision of all information that is 
material to the indictment by the prosecutor.243 To assist the 
process, the bench has reviewed existing national law and 
identified some problems that are likely to arise in the process. 
Moreover, it has suggested practical solutions on the basis of 
domestically available provisions. Despite the bench’s optimistic 
disposition,244 delays cannot be eliminated or fully anticipated. In 
addition, the bench cannot decide, in lieu of a national court, 
how these can be tackled. 
 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/outreach/11bisreports/11bis_norac_ademi_
progressreport_17th.pdf. 
243. See BiH Transfer Law art. 4, Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br. 
61/2004, Dec. 29, 2004 (permitting the acceptance of facts or documentary evidence 
already proven or admitted in a Tribunal proceeding). The issue raised by a number of 
accused regarding the time it will take to translate materials from English into a 
language they understand is of no consequence because the same problem would arise 
even if trial were to take place before the Tribunal. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rašević & 
Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with 
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 98 (July 8, 2005). Moreover, access to any confidential 
material may be acheived by employing Rule 75. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-
02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 75 (Apr. 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, 
Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 24 (Sept. 1, 2005). Ultimately, the efficiency of the 
procedure for accepting evidence and facts established by the ICTY largely depends on 
the conduct of the parties. To this end, the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (“OSCE”) issued a recommendation in its Fourth Report on the Status of the 
Rašević and Todović Case suggesting that “since the decision on taking judicial notice 
may be issued late in the proceedings, for the purposes of judicial economy and to 
ensure that parties are not placed at a disadvantage in the presentation of necessary 
evidence, . . . the parties [should] submit any motion for judicial notice and the courts 
to decide on such motions at the earliest stages of the proceedings possible.” Mission to 
Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, Fourth Report in the Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović Case 
Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis, at 1 (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/14071-eng.pdf; see also Mission to Bosn. & Herz., 
OSCE, Second Report Case of Defendant Gojko Janković Transferred to the State Court pursuant 
to Rule 11bis (July 2006), available at www.oscebih.org/documents/13970-eng.pdf; 
Mission to Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, Fourth Report in the Paško Ljubičić Case Transferred to the 
State Court pursuant to Rule 11bis (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.oscebih.org/
documents/14043-eng.pdf. 
244. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 116 (July 20, 2005) (holding that 
trials before national courts “may be sooner than in the Tribunal”). The Tribunal’s 
optimism may not seem very realistic given the amount of such serious cases referred to 
the national courts. 
BEKOU_K-FINAL 5/22/2010  2:51 PM 
774 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723 
It would be wrong to suggest that delays ensuing as a result 
of referrals would a priori jeopardize international human rights 
standards set out in the main human rights treaties and 
developed through the practice of the international monitoring 
bodies and judicial institutions.245 There is ample jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) on the issue 
of delays and its impact on the right to a hearing within 
reasonable time. The circumstances of each case have to be taken 
into account, “in particular the complexity of the case, the 
conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, and the 
importance of what was at stake for the applicant in litigation.”246 
The ECtHR has never set any rigid time limits with regard to the 
length of the proceedings in criminal cases. The court has stated 
on many occasions that the principle of expedited hearing must 
be taken into consideration in conjunction with the more 
general principle of proper administration of justice.247 It is to be 
expected that in fact-rich cases, where complex legal issues are at 
stake, the proceedings will last longer than ordinary criminal or 
civil cases. Such cases normally involve a greater body of evidence 
as well as legal issues that take longer to resolve. A higher 
threshold on the acceptability of delays is therefore to be 
expected. 
Another question is whether the referral bench can rely on 
the findings of other international human rights institutions 
when assessing the overall effectiveness of the national judicial 
system for the purposes of referral. For example, would the 
concluding observations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
in which the country in question had been found to 
systematically violate the right to a fair hearing within a 
reasonable time, compel the bench to deny referral to that 
 
245. Although article 14 of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights does not 
contain any explicit reference to the factor of time as a substantial part of the due 
process, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has established through its practice that 
“the concept of a fair hearing necessarily entails that justice be rendered without undue 
delay.” U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], Communication No. 203/1986: Views of the 
Human Rights Committee Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Muñoz-Hermoza v. Peru), ¶ 11.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/34/D/203/1986 (Nov. 4, 1988). 
246. Humen v. Poland, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1168 (2001); see also Frydlender v. 
France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, ¶ 43. 
247. See Boddaert v. Belgium, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. (Ser. A) 242, 257 (1993); Coëme v. 
Belgium, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, 133. 
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country? The same question could be posed with respect to 
repeated findings in judgments of the ECtHR concerning the 
duration of national criminal proceedings in a specific country.248 
There is no sufficiently relevant judicial precedent in any of 
the countries considered for referrals that indicates that the right 
to a hearing within reasonable time would be a significant 
problem. Most of the ECtHR case law on the issue of the length 
of proceedings concerns the judicial systems of Croatia249 and 
Serbia.250 However, all of these cases cover civil matters.251 The 
same is true with respect to cases that have arisen before the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee.252 In the countries that have been 
chosen for referrals, civil disputes are dealt with in separate 
chambers from criminal law cases. Moreover, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity are heard before chambers that are 
 
248. There were numerous judgments in a series of unreported companion cases 
on length of criminal proceedings before the Turkish Martial Law Courts. See, e.g., 
Bürkev v. Turkey, App. No. 26480/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Kanbur v. Turkey, 
App. No. 28291/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Başpınar v. Turkey, App. No. 
29280/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R.Oct. 30, 2001); Hasan Yağız v. Turkey, App. No. 31834/96 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Adıyaman v. Turkey, App. No. 31880/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 
2001); Genç v. Turkey, App. No. 31891/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Pekdaş v. 
Turkey, App. No. 31960/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Akçam v. Turkey, App. No. 
32964/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Keskin v. Turkey, App. No. 32987/96 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Karademir v. Turkey, App. No. 32990/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 
2001); Akyazı v. Turkey, App. No. 33362/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); İnan v. 
Turkey, App. No. 39428/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Erdemli v. Turkey, App. No. 
29495/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001). These cases are available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
249. See, e.g., Napijalo v. Croatia, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 735 (2003); Aćimović v. Croatia, 
2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Radoš v. Croatia, App. No. 45435/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 7, 
2002); Delić v. Croatia, App. No. 48771/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 27, 2002). These cases 
are available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
250. See, e.g., Mikuljanac v. Serbia, App. No. 41513/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 9, 2007); 
Jevremović v. Serbia, App. No. 3150/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 17, 2007); Samardžić and 
Plastika v. Serbia, App. No. 28443/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 17, 2007); Tomić v. Serbia, 
App. No. 25959/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 2007). These cases are available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
251. There are only three cases that have originated in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and concern the length of enforcement procedures in civil matters. See Pejaković v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 337/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2007); Karanović v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 39462/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 20, 2007); Jeličić v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (2006). These cases are available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
252. See HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/71/HRV (Apr. 30, 2001). 
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equally distinct from the ordinary criminal law chambers.253 As a 
result, the efficiency of the latter that should be individually 
assessed in order to determine whether they are able to provide 
fair trial within reasonable time to referred defendants. 
One need only look to the actual length of proceedings in 
referred cases at the national level. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
six cases involving nine indictees were completed by August 2009: 
Dušan Fuštar, Momćilo Gruban, Gojko Janković, Duško Knežević, 
Paško Ljubičič, Željko Mejakić, Mitar Rašević, Radovan Stanković, 
and Savo Todović.254 Only the Trbić case is still in the trial 
stage.255 Looking at the length of procedure, each case took 
approximately two years from the time of referral to reaching 
judgment in the first instance. In Croatia, the first instance 
judgment in the case of Ademi and Norac was reached thirty-
three months after the referral. The case of Vladimir Kovačevič, 
which was referred to Serbia, is not representative because of the 
accused’s health issues.256 
Key to fair trial is the defendant’s access to counsel and 
provision of adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a 
 
253. See ICTY, Capacity Building, http://www.icty.org/sid/240 (last visited Feb. 20, 
2010) (stating that the chambers for war crimes were established within several county 
courts in Croatia, the Belgrade District Court in Serbia, and the State Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina). 
254. See, e.g., Sud BiH, Cases in Trial or on Appeal Against Verdict: K-KRŽ-05/70 
Stanković Radovan, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=20&zavrsen=
1&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, Cases with Second-Instance Verdicts 
Delivered: X-KR-06/241 – Ljubičić Paško, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/
?opcija=predmeti&id=37&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, Cases 
with Second-Instance Verdicts Delivered: X-KRŽ-05/161 – Janković Gojko, 
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=19&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, Cases with Second-Instance Verdicts Delivered: X-KRŽ-06/200 
– Mejakić Željko and Others, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=
33&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, Cases with Second-Instance 
Verdicts Delivered: X-KR-06/200-1 – Fuštar Duškan, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/
?opcija=predmeti&id=140&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, 
Cases with Second-Instance Verdicts Delivered: X-KRŽ-06/275 – Rašević and Another, 
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=43&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2010); The cases against Mejakić and Fuštar were separated due to Dušan 
Fuštar’s guilty plea during the closing stages of the trial. See ICTY, Status of Transferred 
Cases, http://www.icty.org/sid/8934 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
255. See Sud BiH, Cases in Trial or on Appeal Against Verdict: X-KR-07/386 – Trbić 
Milorad, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=47&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
256. Press Release, ICTY, Vladimir Kovačevič Case Referred to Serbia, Doc. No. 
CVO/MOW/1127e (Nov. 17, 2006). 
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defense.257 Having counsel of the accused’s own choosing is 
central to the right of fair trial.258 The right to counsel of one’s 
own choosing is not, however, without limitation. An accused is 
free to exercise this right provided that his counsel of choice is 
entitled to appear before the relevant court.259 A side effect of 
referrals might be that counsel who represented the accused 
before the ICTY may not be entitled to appear before the courts 
of the state in which the indictment is referred. This is due to the 
potentially large number of states the bench may choose from, 
under Rule 11 bis(A).260 Indeed, most states stipulate specific 
conditions that have to be fulfilled before a lawyer is admitted for 
practice before national courts.261 The bench acknowledged this 
fact, but emphasised that the problem can be solved if special 
 
257.  See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 75 (July 22, 2005) (rejecting the argument that the sixty-day 
window contained in the BiH criminal code to schedule a trial after the initial 
arraignment is undue because defense preparations should begin earlier); Prosecutor v. 
Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 
bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 85 (July 8, 2005) (same). 
258. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 231, art. 
14(3)(b), 14(3)(d). But see HRC, Communication No. 283/1988: Views of the Human Rights 
Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Little v. Jamaica), ¶ 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/283/l988 
(Nov. 1, 1991) (noting that article 14(3)(d) “does not entitle the accused to choose 
counsel provided to him free of charge”). But see also Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 223, art. 6(3)(c) (explaining that 
the European Court of Human Rights sets numerous limits to the right for legal 
assistance of the defendant’s own choosing); Croissant v. Germany, 237-B Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(Ser. A) (1992). 
“[N]otwithstanding the importance of a relationship of confidence between lawyer 
and client, this right is not absolute.” Mayzit v. Russia, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 805, 818 
(2006). The right to choose one’s counsel “is necessarily subject to certain limitations 
where free legal aid is concerned and also where it is for the courts to decide whether 
the interests of justice require that the accused be defended by counsel appointed by 
them.” Id. Thus, a national court can override a defendant’s wishes when there are 
sufficient grounds for doing so in the interest of justice. Id. (citing Croissant, 237-B Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)). 
259. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 21 (conditioning the right to counsel on 
specific requirements); ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 44; see also Mayzit, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
at 818 (holding that the right to counsel is conditional on specific requirements being 
met is the general practice of the European Court for Human Rights). 
260. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A). 
261. See, e.g., Zakon o sudu Bosne i Hercegovine (pročišćeni tekst) [Law on the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (revised text)] art. 12(2), Službeni glasnik Bosne i 
Hercegovine br. 49/2009, June 22, 2009, available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/
docs/zakoni/en/law_on_court_of_bih_-_consolidated_text.pdf. 
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admission is provided for in the states considered for referral.262 
The bench also observed that the issue of counsel availability is 
speculative at the time of the referral hearing.263 Whether any 
lawyer will be allowed to appear before a given national court 
postreferral should be of interest to the bench, but only insofar 
as this will affect the ability of the accused to be represented by 
counsel of his own choosing. Whether the same counsel 
representing the accused before the ICTY will be able to 
represent him after the referral has taken place should be of no 
concern to the bench. The right to counsel is not breached by 
referral. 
Concerns have also been raised by accused who claimed that 
the right to publicly paid counsel before the national courts is 
limited when compared to the ICTY.264 On the issue of counsel 
compensation, the bench was satisfied that a limited right to 
publicly paid counsel exists, when the accused is not able to bear 
the cost of legal representation.265 A potentially better legal aid 
 
262. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 39 (July 20, 2005); see also Law on 
the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (revised text) arts. 3.4(2), 12(2), Službeni glasnik 
Bosne i Hercegovine br. 49/2009, June 22, 2009; ODSJEK KRIVIČNE ODBRANE 
[DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE], SUD BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, DODATNA PRAVILA 
POSTUPANJA ZA ADVOKATE ODBRANE KOJI POSTUPAJU PRED ODJELOM I ZA RATNE 
ZLOČINE I ODJELOM II ZA ORGANIZOVANI KRIMINAL, PRIVREDNI KRIMINAL I KORUPCIJU 
SUDA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE [ADDITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURES FOR THE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT I FOR WAR CRIMES AND DEPARTMENT II FOR 
ORGANIZED CRIME, CORPORATE CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION OF THE COURT OF BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA], available at http://www.okobih.ba/files/docs/Dodatna_pravila.pdf. 
Serbian and Croatian laws do not provide for this possibility.  
263. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint 
Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 71 (Apr. 7, 2006); 
Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under 
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 77–78 (July 22, 2005); Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for 
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 111–12; Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, 
Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with 
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶¶ 88–89 (July 8, 2005). 
264. See Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with 
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 64; Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for 
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 110; Janković, Decision on Referral of Case 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 54. 
265. See Mejakić, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 71; Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 
bis with Confidential Annexes I and II,  ¶ 88; Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion 
for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 111. 
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system available at the ICTY does not impact whether the fair 
trial criterion is satisfied. 
The issue of self-representation in referred cases is another 
consideration that needs to be addressed. While the ICTY 
accepted that a defendant accused of the most serious crimes 
could represent themselves,266 a number of jurisdictions—
particularly those belonging to the civil law tradition—do not 
permit this arrangement.267 This is also true for countries that 
comprise the former Yugoslavia.268 It has been reiterated both by 
the ICTY269 and some scholars270 that the right of the accused to 
represent himself is not absolute. The inquisitorial approach to 
criminal procedure inherent to a civil law system enables the 
judges to actively participate in the proceedings.271 Another 
feature of such a system is that even when counsel has been 
appointed, the defendant retains the right to participate in the 
trial proceedings.272 As concluded by the ECtHR, the 
appointment of counsel against the defendant’s will may be in 
the interests of justice.273 These interests may include 
 
266. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript of Record at 14574 
(Dec. 18, 2002) (oral ruling of trial chamber on self-representation); see also Prosecutor 
v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing 
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defence, ¶ 25 (May 9, 2003). 
267. See, e.g., C. PR. PÉN. [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 274 (Fr.); Ugolovno-
Protsessual nyi Kodeks [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 51(1) (Russ.); 
Strafprozeßordnung [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. 1, 1877, Reichsgesetzblatt 
[RGBI] 253, as amended, §140(1)–(2) (F.R.G.). 
268. See Code of Criminal Procedure for BiH art. 45(3), Službeni glasnik Bosne i 
Hercegovine, br. 36/2003, Nov. 21, 2003; Code of Criminal Procedure for RH art. 65, 
Narodne novine br. 62, Apr. 12, 2003; Code of Criminal Procedure for RS art. 71, 
Službeni glasnik S.R. Srbije br. 46/2006, May 25, 2006; see also Mission to Bosn. & Herz., 
OSCE, Second OSCE Report in the Case of Defendant Radovan Stanković Transferred to the 
State Court pursuant to Rule 11bis, at 1 (May 2006) [herainafter Second OSCE Report on 
Stanković], available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/14066-eng.pdf (noting that 
Stanković’s motion to represent himself during the proceedings was rejected). 
269. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal on Assignment of Defence Counsel, ¶ 12 (Nov. 1, 2004). 
270. See Nina H. B. Jorgensen, The Right of the Accused to Self-Representation Before 
International Criminal Tribunals, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 711–26 (2004); see also Vojin 
Dimitrijevic & Marko Milanovic, Human Rights before the International Criminal Court, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: FROM DISSEMINATION TO APPLICATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
GÖRAN MELANDER 149, 163–65 (Jonas Grimheden & Rolf Ring eds., 2006). 
271. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 353–76 (2d ed. 2008) 
(exploring the differences between the two systems). 
272. See Dimitrijevic & Milanovic, supra note 270, at 164. 
273. See, e.g., Croissant v. Germany, 237-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 31–32 (1992); 
see also Jorgensen, supra note 270, at 712, 715. 
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guaranteeing efficiency of process, prevention of misconduct of 
the accused, or securing competent defence in complicated 
cases. Hence, it cannot be said that there is a breach of the right 
to fair trial when the right to self-representation is restricted, as 
long as the defendant has an opportunity to actively participate 
and contribute to his defence. 
The success of a trial relies upon evidence available to prove 
or disprove the culpability of the accused. A major role in this 
process is reserved for witnesses, whose availability is therefore 
crucial. There is no guarantee that witnesses will be willing to 
appear, and their availability may be influenced by perceptions of 
neutrality of the state, difficulties in locating them due to 
mobility during and after the conflict, fear of persecution by the 
accused, and an assessment of the perceived risk of prosecution 
for any of the crimes in question.274 Trial in the state where the 
crime was committed might assist in securing the presence of 
witnesses, because of the proximity to the territory of the 
commission of the crime. This is yet another reason why the 
selection of an appropriate state for referral is important. 
Compelling witnesses to testify is a matter for national law and is 
reserved for witnesses present within the territory of a state.275 For 
witnesses located in other states, this would be a mutual legal 
assistance issue. Regulated at the interstate level, witness 
appearance will be facilitated by recourse to the European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(“ECMA”),276 to which all states of the former Yugoslavia are 
parties.277 The Tribunal, in its practice on the issue of witness 
 
274. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 57 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-
23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 79 (May 17, 2005); see also 
Mission to Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – Progress and Obstacles 23–28 (Mar. 23, 2005). 
275. See Criminal Procedure Code of BiH art. 81, Službeni glasnik Bosne i 
Hercegovine br. 36/2003, Nov. 21, 2003 (making witness testimony compulsory when 
summoned); see also Zakon o sudskoj policiji Bosne i Hercegovine [Law on the Judicial 
Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina] art. 5(1), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br. 
21/2003, July 24, 2003. 
276. European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 20, 
1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter European Assistance Convention]. 
277. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 85; 
Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for 
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 102 (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević & 
Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with 
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availability, has reviewed the existence of provisions in national 
legislation of the state concerned. The difficulties foreseen 
regarding witness availability are likely to be greater at the 
national level compared to trial before the ICTY, because as an 
issue of interstate cooperation, states are allowed considerable 
discretion to refuse the request.278 Such discretion is not available 
when executing an ICTY cooperation request.279 This is not to 
say, however, that appearance of witnesses before the Tribunal 
has been trouble-free, nor that cooperation in general has always 
been forthcoming.280 Regardless of the impact that the lack of an 
international enforcement system has had on the effective 
functioning and ultimate success of the Tribunal, the advantages 
a coercive national system generally offers when compelling 
witnesses to testify would not be applicable to witnesses residing 
abroad.281 
Another consideration relates to witness protection 
measures available nationally. Whereas such measures have been 
 
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 93 (July 8, 2005); Stanković, Decision on Referral of 
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 82. Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia also maintain several bilateral 
agreements. See, e.g., Sporazum o saradnji u krivičnom gonjenju učinilaca krivičnih dela 
protiv čovečnosti i drugih dobara zaštićenih međunarodnim pravom [Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Prosecution of Perpetrators of Crimes Against Humanity and Other 
Goods Protected by International Law], Monteneg.-Serb., Oct. 31, 2007, available at 
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/saradnja/sporazum_trz_vdtrcg_lat.pdf; 
Sporazum o saradnji u progonu učinilaca krivičnih dela ratnih zločina, zločina protiv 
čovečnosti i genocida [Agreement on Cooperation in Prosecution of Perpetrators of 
War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide], Serb.-Croat., Oct. 13, 2006, 
available at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/saradnja/
sporazum_trz_dorh_lat.pdf; Memorandum o saglasnosti u ostvarivanju i unapređenju 
saradnje u borbi protiv svih oblika teškog kriminala [Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Implementation and Promotion of Cooperation in Prosecution of All Forms of 
Serious Crime], Bosn. & Herz.-Serb., July 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/saradnja/memorandum_rjt_trz_tbih_lat.pdf. 
278. See European Assistance Convention, supra note 276, art. 2. Also of interest is 
article 8 of the convention which does not attach any penalty to witnesses failing to 
answer a summons to appear. Id. art. 8. 
279. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 29. 
280. See generally PIERRE HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY 
BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2004) 
(providing an overview of state cooperation with the ICTY). 
281. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 26 (noting 
that the reference to cooperation in Security Council Resolution 1503 is superficial to 
the point that it disregards the potential lack of domestic authority to obtain witnesses 
and evidence). 
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carefully crafted at the international level,282 the protection that 
is provided for in national systems may not always rise to a similar 
standard.283 The Tribunal recognised that measures aiming to 
protect witnesses would promote their presence, but downplayed 
the impact such measures (or the absence thereof) could have 
on fair trial.284 This narrow approach is formalistic and fails to 
assess the effect that refusal or reluctance of witnesses to appear 
would have on fair trials. The inexperience of some national 
courts in dealing with witness protection measures may lead to 
serious violations of some of the most important due process 
guaranties.285 A particular problem arises with regard to measures 
adopted in the course of proceedings before the ICTY that are 
no longer necessary postreferral. In the case of Željko Mejakić 
before the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”), the 
prosecutor required lifting of certain protective measures as 
requested by some witnesses. The court rejected this motion, as 
according to the decision of the referral bench in this particular 
case, protective measures granted to victims and witnesses before 
ICTY were to remain in force. It follows that the national court 
does not have the jurisdiction to decide on this matter. 
Consequently, protective measures had to remain in force 
despite their no longer being needed.286 
 
282.  See Florence Mumba, Ensuring a Fair Trial whilst Protecting Victims and Witnesses 
– Balancing of Interests, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF 
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 21, at 305, 359–71 (listing examples including 
witness testimony via video conferencing and voice or image distortion). 
283. See Carla Del Ponte, Prosecuting the Individuals bearing the Highest Level of 
Responsibility, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 516, 519 (2004); Mark S. Ellis, Coming to Terms with its 
Past – Serbia’s New Court for the Prosecution of War Crimes, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 183–
84 (2004); Milena Sterio, Seeking the Best Forum to Prosecute War Crimes: Proposed Paradigms 
and Solutions, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 887, 892 (2006). 
284. See Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 105 (July 8, 
2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 89 (May 17, 2005). 
285. For example, in the case of Radovan Stanković before the State Court of BiH, 
the trial bench decided to exclude the public from all main trial proceedings. See Second 
OSCE Report on Stanković, supra note 268, at 3–11. The bench was concerned, among 
other issues, about the protection of witnesses. See id. 
286. See First OSCE Report in Mejakić, supra note 240, at 3–6. Some cases also discuss 
the practice of the European Court for Human Rights on the issue of protection of 
witnesses. See Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647 (1998); Krasniki v. 
Czech Republic, App. No. 51277/99, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2006). 
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Detention on remand, primarily a question relating to the 
right to liberty, also constitutes an important tool in securing the 
presence of the accused and preserving the integrity of 
evidence.287 Attention to the issue of detention has been paid 
only in respect of prison conditions, and not in terms of the 
duration of the pretrial detention.288 This is of particular 
relevance to the added phase encountered in referral cases, that 
of adaptation of an ICTY indictment by a national prosecutor. 
The question that arises is whether the ICTY Order on Detention 
remains in force after the referral has taken place and prevails 
over the national legislation, or whether national courts ought to 
review custody in accordance with nationally applicable rules.289 
Rule 11 bis is silent in this regard. The ICTY Appeals Chamber 
pronounced itself incompetent to decide on Janković’s motion 
for provisional release after the decision on referral of his 
indictment had been released.290 In order to avoid a situation in 
which a person would be deprived of any legal remedies to 
challenge his pretrial detention before the indictment had been 
confirmed, thus constituting a violation of fundamental human 
rights standards, the approach of the appeals chamber must be 
interpreted as enabling the national courts, to which the 
indictment had been transferred, to decide on this issue. The 
national courts would therefore have the authority to at least 
review an ICTY Order on Detention. Although it is clear that this 
should take place under the law of the forum where the 
indictment has been referred to, the possibility for a gap in the 
law to exist is ever present. In particular, it is not clear what law 
ought to be applied at the preadaptation of the indictment stage. 
States in such position ought to either legislate for this possibility 
or allow national courts to implement the rules on detention 
applicable to the investigative phase of the proceedings by 
 
287. See Dimitrijevic & Milanovic, supra note 270, at 160. 
288. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65, Decision on Joint Defence 
Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 56–62 (Apr.7, 2006); 
Janković, Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11 bis 
Referral, ¶¶ 69–76 (Nov. 15, 2005). 
289. See First OSCE Report in Janković, supra note 240, at 2–5; First OSCE Report in 
Stanković, at 3–19. 
290. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23, Decision on Appeal of the Trial 
Chamber’s Decision on Provisional Release (Nov. 30, 2005). 
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analogy.291 There is a strong argument in favor of the latter 
approach because nothing prevents the introduction of new 
counts to the indictment both in the stage of its adaptation or 
afterwards.292 
An examination into applicable law determines at best the 
adequacy of the forum through an examination of the existence 
of legislation. However, whether this suffices to guarantee a fair 
trial for the accused is uncertain, particularly in the former 
Yugoslavia where new and generally untested legislation is in 
place. Such legislation has been criticised by both the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) 
and civil society.293 It is important to note that each case is to be 
examined in concreto. The bench could consider the criticisms 
expressed regarding the framework in place but it would be 
unable practically to offer any solution, as this would exceed its 
mandate. Some discussion on the available legal framework may 
prove helpful to the domestic court, which may be faced with 
similar issues in the future. Highlighting potential problems 
helps, but remains abstract and of limited use to the national 
system. Issues pertaining to fair trial that may have arisen in one 
case, may of course be of no relevance to another, unless there 
are systemic failures of the national courts. This is why the bench 
examines fair trial as part of the availability of the system and 
raises queries through the decisions on further information and 
 
291. See BiH Transfer Law art. 2(2), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br. 
61/2004, Dec. 29, 2004. 
292. In practice the State Prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina has added 
additional counts on the adapted indictment. See Sud BiH, Inditment Against Trbić 
Milorad, No. X-KR-07/386 (July 20 2007), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/
docs/optuznice/2007/milorad_trbic_-_indictment_-_eng.pdf; Sud BiH, Indictment 
Against Željko Mejakić, Momćilo Gruban, Dušan Fuštar, Duško Knežević, No. KT-RZ-
91/06 (July 7, 2006) available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//
pasko_ljubicic_-_indictment_-_eng.pdf; Sud BiH, Indictment Against Radovan 
Stanković, No. KT-RZ-45/05 (Nov. 28, 2005), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/
files/docs/optuznice/STANKOVIC_INDICTMENT.pdf; Sud Bosne i Hercegovine, 
Second Indictment Against Gojko Janković, No. KT-RZ-163/05 (July 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//gojko_jankovic_-_indictment_-_eng_-
_04july2006.pdf. 
293. See Ellis, supra note 283, at 168 (assessing Serbian courts before the creation of 
the war crimes court); see also Brady Hall, Using Hybrid Tribunals as Trivias: Furthering the 
Goals of Post-Conflict Justice while Transferring Cases from the ICTY to Serbia’s Domestic War 
Crimes Tribunal, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 39, 50–53 (2005) (exploring issues of legitimacy 
of Serbian criminal courts); Zoglin, supra note 206, at 44–72. 
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through monitoring, which is used by the bench as a means of 
determining that the fair trial requirement has been met.294 
The assessment of the bench would have been more 
accurate and complete had a body of national jurisprudence 
been developed following referrals. Only a close examination of 
such jurisprudence would have been possible to assess the 
application of the existing legal framework to the referred cases 
to discern whether the fair trial requirement is met in practice. 
The early practice is not very encouraging. Of the issues 
discussed above, the lack of competence by national courts 
curtails their ability to tackle practical problems in a constructive 
way. Fair trial is only discussed in the broadest possible terms 
focusing on specific themes. Fair trial as a prerequisite for 
referral is pivotal, but the bench’s limited remit does not allow 
for a detailed investigation into the specifics both in terms of 
scope and in terms of the timing of its determination prior to 
referral. This oversight of Rule 11 bis is partly rectified through 
monitoring, which this Article will return to shortly. 
B. Sentencing Issues and Quality of Prisons 
Although the requirement in Rule 11 bis relating to 
sentencing was of greater relevance at the time the rule was first 
adopted, it is not currently of any practical relevance, given that 
the death penalty has been abolished in the states of former 
Yugoslavia.295 The quality of prisons is of more importance. Steps 
have been taken to ameliorate prison conditions and it is 
therefore unlikely that such conditions will affect the decision to 
refer.296 This may explain why the ICTY’s treatment of this issue is 
generally very brief.297 
 
294. See infra Part IV. 
295. All states of the former Yugoslavia are parties to Protocol Number 13 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. See Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty in all Circumstances, May 3, 2002, 2246 U.N.T.S. 110; see also Council 
of Eur., Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances, CETS No.: 187, http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/commun/
cherchesig.asp?nt=187&cm=&df=&cl=eng (Mar. 9, 2010) (listing signatories to the 
additional protocol). 
296. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment has been strongly involved in monitoring prison 
conditions in the former Yugoslavia and posts reports regarding each state. See Council 
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A quite separate sentencing issue is the possibility that the 
accused, whose indictment has been referred to a national court, 
may receive a much higher sentence than the one he would have 
received had he been tried in The Hague.298 This is not an issue 
that needs to be examined at the time of deciding a referral. As 
long as the sentence imposed nationally is in line with the 
sentencing practice of that state for similar offences, this would 
not be a fair trial issue to be considered by the Tribunal. 
Inevitably, the generally lower sentences imposed by the Tribunal 
will not be replicated before national courts. This certainly 
constitutes a paradox when looked at from the perspective of 
indictments referred to national courts on the basis of their lower 
gravity, but it does not and should not affect referrals. 
IV. MONITORING OF NATIONAL PROCEEDINGS299 
Rule 11 bis(D)(iv) enables the prosecutor to send observers 
to monitor the proceedings before the national court to which 
the indictment is referred.300 The discretionary language of this 
rule means that the prosecutor is not under an obligation to do 
so and may choose to entirely forego any form of monitoring.301 
 
of Eur., Council for the Prevention of Torture, States: Documents and Visits, 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states.htm (Last visited Aug. 28, 2009). 
297. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral 
of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 72–76 (July 25, 2005). 
298. Gojko Janković was sentenced to thirty-four years of imprisonment following 
the referral of his indictment for trial before the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber. See 
Criminal Gets 34 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at A8. For a quick comparison, the 
different sentencing span employed by the ICTY and the Serbian courts for cases arising 
out of the crimes committed in Vukovar, Croatia are of interest. The ICTY trial chamber 
acquitted Miroslav Radić, and sentenced the commander of the Serbian forces, Mile 
Mrkšić, who was responsible for the murder of two hundred people in Ovcara, near 
Vukovar, to twenty years imprisonment. See Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 713 (Sept. 27, 2007). Veselin Šljivančanin, another high profile Serbian 
military officer that took part in the Vukovar battle was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment. See id. ¶ 716. The Serbian court, for the same crime of murder of two 
hundred civilians in Ovcara, sentenced seven people to twenty years imprisonment, five 
to eighteen, and three to fifteen years, including those who were part of the shooting 
squad. See Presuda Ovčaru [Verdict for Ovcar], RADIO-TELEVIZIJA SRBIJE (Belgrade), Mar. 
19, 2009, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/135/Hronika/49514/
Presude+za+Ovčaru+.html. 
299. ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, supra note 67, at 170–71. 
300. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(D)(iv). 
301. See id. (utilizing the word “may” instead of “shall”). Despite this element of 
discretion, the Referral Bench has in practice always imposed this extra level of scrutiny 
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Monitoring was envisaged as a mechanism enabling observers in 
domestic trials to oversee the proceedings and report back to 
The Hague, and thereby allowing the Office of the Prosecutor 
(“OTP”) to request the revocation of the referral under Rule 11 
bis(F).302 Due to the time constraints set by the Tribunal’s 
completion strategy, it is unrealistic to expect that any cases will 
be deferred back to the ICTY. The effect of monitoring is 
preemptive. States wishing to avoid having the case removed 
from their national courts and taken back to The Hague are 
more likely to abide by international standards.303 Moreover, 
depending on the quality of the observers and the efficacy of the 
reporting system in place, some streamlining might be achieved 
at the international level. It will be useful for the future to create 
an extensive archive of such reports so that they can be used by 
similar adjudicative efforts elsewhere. Moreover, an accurate 
snapshot of national prosecutions at any given time may assist the 
ICTY prosecutor in concentrating his efforts on the remainder of 
the trials before the Tribunal. 
In most instances, this monitoring task is not undertaken by 
OTP directly but has been entrusted to the OSCE.304 This type of 
“outsourcing” is well within the prosecutor’s powers and given 
the significant experience the OSCE possesses in this field, the 
 
from the Prosecutor’s office on a referred indictment. See Tolbert & Kontic, supra note 
20, at 154. 
302. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(F). Note that revocation will be done under 
the deferral provisions, so this must be accomplished prior to the conclusion of the 
national trial. See id. Even though this is not mentioned in Rule 11 bis (F), it would be 
obvious that if the ICTY wanted to try a defendant after the conclusion of his trial before 
a national court, it would have to invoke the exception to the non bis in idem provision 
found in article 10 ICTY Statute. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 10; see also  Katrina 
Gustafson & Nicole Janisiewicz, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1091, 1117–18 (2008). 
303. Accordingly, the referral bench has charged the prosecutor to monitor every 
referred case allowing not just oversight of the individual case, but also encouraging fair 
trial guarantees and diligent prosecution in any subsequent or concurrent referrals. See 
Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis: Partly Confidential (Attached Schedules to 
Annex I Filed Confidential), ¶ 57, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT 
(Sept. 2, 2004). 
304. See Permanent Council, OSCE, Decision No. 673: Co-operation Between the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, No. PC.DEC/673 (May 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/pdf_documents/2005/05/14401-1.pdf. 
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outcome of the monitoring process should be far superior 
compared to monitoring undertaken in house.305 
Although the rule regarding monitoring only refers to the 
prosecutor, in practice it has been of relevance to both the 
defense and the bench.306 The latter has incorporated 
monitoring in the examination of the fair trial requirement. The 
absence of a concrete test for the assessment of fair trial prior to 
referral, has led the bench to adopt a more hands-on approach 
on the issue, which includes ordering the prosecutor to monitor 
national trials and to provide reports to that effect after referral 
has taken place. 
The first issue that arises is whether the bench acted within 
its powers when ordering the prosecutor to monitor national 
proceedings.307 The answer to this has to be in the affirmative. As 
convincingly explained in the Stanković appeal, “a Chamber of 
Judges may issue orders to the prosecutor as a party to a case 
before it. So long as the orders are reasonably related to the 
Chamber’s mandate in the case before it, they fall within the 
Chamber’s inherent powers.”308 
A more interesting question relates to whether the bench 
may rely on the monitoring in order to reach its decision in 
favour of referral, which renders monitoring an essential part of 
the fair trial test. The Tribunal has vociferously stressed that it 
 
305. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc./RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (urging “States and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute funds, equipment 
and services to the International Tribunal, including the offer of expert personnel”). 
Monitoring by the OSCE would clearly fall under this provision. Id. 
306. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 103 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-
PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 103 
(July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 111 (July 8, 
2005) (observing that the prosecutor may disregard the interests of the defense); 
Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under 
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 94 (May 17, 2005). 
307. The prosecutor submitted that monitoring in Rule 11 bis is envisaged “on 
behalf of” the prosecutor—not the referral bench—and maintained that the bench in 
issuing orders acted “ultra vires.” Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-
AR11bis.1, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶¶ 44–45 (Sept. 1, 2005). 
308. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 54; see also Prosecutor v. Mejakić, 
Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on 
Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 93 (Apr. 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-
23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 62 (Nov. 15, 2005). 
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has the authority to satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair 
trial. In the view of the bench,  
whatever information the Referral Bench reasonably feels it 
needs and whatever orders it reasonably finds necessary, are 
within the Referral Bench’s authority so long as they assist 
the Bench in determining whether the proceedings 
following the transfer will be fair. The Referral Bench must 
bear in mind the considerable discretion that the Rule 
affords the Prosecutor, but always the ultimate inquiry 
remains the fairness of the trial the accused will receive.309  
The approach of the bench has altered the rationale behind the 
adoption of the monitoring provision in the RPE. It is beyond 
doubt that the bench has the ability to order the prosecutor to 
conduct monitoring. Deciding in favor of referrals on the basis of 
availability of subsequent monitoring, however, is not grounded 
in Rule 11 bis. The objection is not so much because monitoring 
is being employed in a manner different to its originally intended 
use, but because the bench finds that the fairness requirement 
has been satisfied on the basis of a mechanism (i.e. monitoring), 
which has yet to take place. 
The bench has to be admired for its ingenuity. It is hoped 
that by using monitoring in such a way, the limited scope Rule 11 
bis contemplates regarding the examination of the fair trial 
requirement will be overcome. The burden is shifted away from 
the Tribunal so that it can proceed with the referral. Despite the 
limited insight into fair trial at the time of the referral hearing, 
subsequent monitoring offers relief to the bench. 
CONCLUSION 
The pressing need to conclude the trials before the ad hoc 
international tribunals contributed to reverting cases back to 
national courts. However, this approach would have never been 
adopted were it not for a significant shift in the political attitude 
and the ability of the judiciaries in the affected states. While it is 
still early to assess whether the national trials on referred cases 
will satisfy the interests of justice since the final decision has been 
 
309. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 50; see also Mejakić, Decision on 
Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 92. 
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reached in six of them;310 it must be said that these cases, along 
with numerous other national trials, have contributed in 
overturning the presumption that prosecution for core 
international crimes is better served by international tribunals. In 
the inception of the tribunals, national courts were deemed unfit 
to deal with such serious cases. The recent emphasis placed on 
national courts is not only due to improvement on the situation 
on the ground, but may be largely attributed to the fact that the 
ICTY is reaching the end of its life. Referrals, encouraged by the 
completion strategy, belatedly rectify the noninvolvement of 
national legal orders in most part of the Tribunal’s work. 
Although concurrent jurisdiction has always played a key part in 
the ICTY Statute, the real shift came with the need to complete 
more cases prior to the termination of its functions. Concurrent 
jurisdiction was therefore reinterpreted to enable referrals of 
indictments to national courts. 
Rule 11 bis is not perfect, however. The referral practice 
reveals numerous shortcomings in the process. The superficial 
examination of the suitable forum and applicable law criteria has 
already led to some practical problems. The (almost) total 
reliance on the principle of territoriality heavily burdens the 
State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina with all but two cases 
referred to its War Crimes Chamber. With more than eighty 
other indictees and considerably more modest resources than 
those at the ICTY, the state court will undoubtedly have great 
problems in dealing with the entrusted cases. At the same time, 
the dropping of some of the charges in the case of Ademi & 
Norac, and the inability of the Croatian prosecutor to amend the 
indictment in order to include all forms of command 
responsibility of the accused, led to the acquittal of one and to 
the very lenient conviction of the other.311 The trial of Kovačevič, 
the only case referred to Serbia, has not even commenced due to 
the inability of the accused to stand trial, a fact that was well-
known to the ICTY before the referral took place. 
Notwithstanding these problems, the fact that practically all 
of the states from the affected territory received at least one case 
from the ICTY shows that the criminal justice systems in these 
countries have achieved a certain level of respect and trust 
 
310. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
311. See supra note 9. 
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amongst the international community. The opportunity to 
exercise jurisdiction in such serious cases involving grave 
breaches of humanitarian and human rights law represents an 
opportunity for further empowerment of the national legal 
systems in the Balkans. 
Although, owing to time constraints, it is highly unlikely that 
there will be any further referrals, it is expected that national 
jurisdictions will have to tackle the numerous cases that did not 
reach the ICTY.312 The experience gained through their 
cooperation with the ICTY will be most valuable in these future 
national prosecutions. In addition, mutual cooperation and 
judicial assistance between the judiciaries from the region needs 
to be strengthened and supported, primarily from the 
perspective of the exchange of experiences. This is not only in 
the service of the past. Effective prosecution of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide on a national level will 
contribute to the prevention of future crimes. But the lessons 
learned from the ICTY episode will be of the utmost importance 
also for the permanent International Criminal Court, which will 
face similar challenges when interacting with national courts.313 
 
312. Particularly with the genesis of so-called “Category 2 cases,” knowledge 
transfers between the Tribunal and national prosecution agencies consisting of evidence 
and other investigatory information were never actively pursued by the prosecutor due 
to the office’s need to focus entirely on the most serious crimes before it. This legacy 
demonstrates how far the shattered legal systems of former Yugoslavian states, 
particularly BiH, have come, but also the way that the relationship between those 
nations and the Tribunal has itself matured. See Tolbert & Kontic, supra note 20, at 157. 
313. Indeed, it has been suggested that a “positive complementarity” model, along 
the lines of article 11 bis, ought to be adopted by the ICC in some form, with the aim of 
encouraging dialogue between the national and international strata of criminal 
accountability. E.g., David Tolbert, International Criminal Law: Past and Future, 30 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L. 1281, 1293–94 (2009). 
